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PROBLEMS IN INSIDER TRADING REGULATION ....

I.

INTRODUCTION

Rarely does an esoteric legal issue evolve into a topic of heated
public debate. Insider trading, however, is one such "hot" topic.
Innumerable law journals, newspapers, and magazines have devoted
countless pages to the subject.' Prosecution of those who illegally
trade securities on the basis of "inside" information is now the
number one priority2 of the Securities and Exchange Commission
1. As Harvey L. Pitt, an eminent authority on securities law, writes, insider trading is "a
scandal that has occupied a prominent place in virtually every newspaper, virtually every day
since May, 1986." Pitt, 2 INSIGHTS 16 & n.12 (1988).
2. Janvey, SEC Investigation of Insider Trading, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 299 (1986). The zeal
with which this offense is prosecuted has caused one critic to remark that the SEC has found a
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(SEC), the federal agency that regulates the securities markets.3
The current regime of insider trading enforcement, however, is
profoundly troubling in many respects. For example, not only does
the offense lack statutory definition,' but the term "insider trading" is
misleading.5 Traditional corporate insiders are not the only people
who face insider trading liability. The SEC and the courts have
extended liability to include almost anyone who trades on any material nonpublic information.6 This extended liability is especially
new "theology."

H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN

(1979). According to Kripke, many of the SEC regulations lack a
demonstrable economic basis, and thus the only way to understand the "maze" of bureaucratic
regulation is to see it as a theology. Id. See also Pitt, supra note 1, at 14 & n. I (citing report of
the N. Y. Times concerning a speech given by John Shad in 1980 when he became Chairman of
the SEC).
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 4

3. The SEC was created under the authority of the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48

Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-vvv (1982 & Supp. IV 1986))
[hereinafter the 1933 Act], and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, 48 Stat.
881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 a-Ill (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter
the 1934 Act]. These acts represent legislative attempts to prevent a recurrence of the
securities abuses of the 1920's and of the conditions that led to the Great Depression. See H.
KRIPKE, supra note 2, at xvii.
4. Neither the 1933 nor the 1934 acts mentions insider trading. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The preamble to the 1934 Act gives as the purpose for its enactment
the prevention of unfair and inequitable market trading. Id. at § 78b. Section 16(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act, a short-swing profit preclusion statute, explicitly was intended to
curb insider trading. Ch. 404, tit. I, § 16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78 (p) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Insider Trading Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 98376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78u(d) (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986))
[hereinafter ITSA], specifically addresses insider trading, but nowhere is the term given
concrete definition. Congress has been unable to surmount an apparent legislative impasse in
its search for a definition. Indeed, Congress dropped the search for a definition of insider
trading under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 in the interest of expeditiously
passing the bill. The Insider Trading SanctionsAct of 1983: Hearingon H.R. 559 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The latest attempt to define insider
trading has been before Congress since 1987. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
5. Although insider trading is generally prosecuted under Sections 10(b) or 14(e) of the
1934 Act, and Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3 promulgated thereunder, these sections and rules do not
use the term "insider trading." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14e-3 (1986). The term generally refers to trading by corporate
insiders on corporate information that has not been publicly announced. Corporate insiders
include directors, officers, controlling shareholders, or people who received the inside
information from corporate insiders-tippees.

R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 264 (1986).

Many of the important insider trading cases of the last several years, however, have involved
trading by persons who were not corporate insiders and who were trading on the basis of
nonpublic information obtained from sources other than the corporations whose securities
they were trading. Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee
on Criminal Law, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INSIDER TRADING OF SECURITIES 1
(1986).
6. Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Criminal
Law, supra note 5. Many of the cases currently prosecuted under the rubric of insider trading
involve neither corporate insiders, nor inside information. Pitt, supra note 1,at 14 (1988). See
infra note 75 and accompanying text. The case law is rife with examples of non-corporate
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troubling because the trading public does not appear to find such conduct intuitively offensive.7 Indeed, there is a general consensus that

insider trading activity is widespread and pervasive in this country
and, therefore, may be acceptable to community norms.' In addition,
many observers believe that insider trading regulation is based on
false assumptions regarding market function, composition, and the
historical causes of the Great Depression. 9 A systematic lack of
empirical data to support the regulatory structure, and the failure of
the SEC, Congress, and the courts to perform systematic cost/benefit
analyses, exacerbate these problems.10
Despite these serious conceptual problems, the SEC and the
courts severely sanction offenders.' 1 Thus, the scales of justice are
insiders who have been prosecuted for trading on information that, although material and
nonpublic, was not corporate inside information. A prime example occurred in Carpenter v.
United States. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (A newspaper reporter was prosecuted under securities
and mail fraud statutes for trading on the advance knowledge of the contents of his own news
column.).
7. For example, Business Week found that "[t]he insider-trading scandal on Wall Street
hasn't upset Americans." Jackson, Business Week/Harris Poll: Insider Trading Isn't a
Scandal, Bus. WK., August 25, 1986, at 74. In fact, the Harris Poll cited in the article
indicated that of those polled "a majority would buy stock based on an insider's tip-and more
than a third of those who would not said they'd be afraid the tip was wrong." Id. SEC
Chairman David Ruder remarked that "the ordinary average American citizen has not
recognized the need to refrain from insider trading, despite the fact that it is a crime and a
securities violation." 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1923 (December 18, 1987) [hereinafter
Remarks of Ruder]. One explanation for the pervasiveness of insider trading activity may be
the lack of statutory definition. Without clear guidelines, it may be difficult to tell what
conduct is legal or illegal.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Carlton & Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy,
An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
798 (1973); Freedman & Sporkin, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement
Program: A Debate on the Enforcement Process, 38 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 781 (1981);
Friedman, Efficient Market Theory and Rule l0b-5 Nondisclosure Claims: A Proposal for
Reconciliation, 47 Mo. L. REV. 745 (1982) [hereinafter Efficient Market Theory]; Gordon &
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 761 (1985); Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. REv.
1449 (1987) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey, A Coasian "Model]; Haddock & Macey,
Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading
Regulation, 30 J. LAW & EcoN. 311 (1987) (hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Regulation on
Demand]; Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98
HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985); Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984); Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119 (1981).
10. For a similar criticism of the SEC's regulatory policy vis-a-vis corporate disclosure
regulation, see generally H. KRIPKE, supra note 2.
11. The penalties for insider trading are severe. The mere investigation of suspected
insider trading activity, even without prosecution, may result in irreparable damage to
employment relationships and business goodwill as the result of the ensuing publicity. Report
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unfairly weighted against the accused.1 2 The decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in United States v. Tull,' 3 however, may
alter the balance. In Tull, the Supreme Court extended the seventh
amendment right to jury trial to actions involving statutory civil penalties.' 4 Although Tull involved only the Clean Water Act, 5 the
Supreme Court's language suggests that all actions involving statutory civil penalties must be tried to a jury on demand. 16 Because
nearly all civil enforcement actions that prosecute insider trading seek
civil penalties under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
(ITSA), the Supreme Court's decision in Tull, as applied to insider
trading cases, may help to restore fairness to the judicial process and
extend the social dialogue on the policy of securities regulation.I7
The right to jury trial alters the balance in civil insider trading
prosecutions because the jury speaks with a different voice than does
the court.'I This voice becomes audible only when one recognizes
of the Task Force on SEC Rules Relating to Investigations, 42 Bus. LAW. 789, 790 (1987)
[hereinafter Report of the Task Forceon SEC Rules]. Criminal liability may result in jail terms
as well as fines, and civil investigations nearly always result in harsh fines. Janvey, supra note
2, at 318-19 & n.49. Securities investigations overwhelmingly result in a consent decree in
which the target of the investigation neither admits nor denies the charges, but agrees to a
permanent injunction against future insider trading activity and a civil penalty, of up to three
times the profits made or losses engendered, under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
(ITSA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. II & Supp. IV 1986). Thus, there are compelling incentives
for targets of SEC investigations to settle. In addition, the SEC's liability determination may
open the floodgates to private litigants seeking damages. See, e.g., Chiang & Bottorff, Boesky
Scandal May Lead to Rush of Civil Lawsuits, 99 Los Angeles Daily J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, ol.
6. This can have serious consequences, because findings of fact from SEC enforcement
proceedings act as collateral estoppel in future litigation. Kerr & Stillman, CollateralEstoppel
Implications ofSEC Adjudications,42 Bus. LAW. 441 (1987). The administrative proceedings
may act as a bar, preventing the SEC's target from relitigating issues decided in the
administrative proceedings. Id. A consent decree, however, has no such effect. In Re Cenco,
Inc. Securities Litigation, 529 F. Supp. 411, 414-16 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Thus, litigants have
compelling incentives to agree to a consent decree.
12. This is a somewhat ironic result in light of the SEC's purported fairness concerns. See
infra note 322.
13. 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). For a discussion of Tull, see infra notes 29-71 and
accompanying text.
14. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1839.
15. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
16. "The Seventh Amendment's guarantee applies to civil actions to collect a civil
penalty." Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835-37.
17. 15 U.S.C. 78u(d) (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986). ITSA provides for a civil penalty
of up to 300% for insider trading activity. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
Criminal actions for insider trading, like other criminal actions, have traditionally been triable
to a jury. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Jacobs, ProceduralMatters in Actions Brought Under
Rule lOb-5, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 361, 402 (1981); Report of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Committee on Criminal Law, supra note 5.
18. The social dialogue is the process of society-creation in a democratic social system.
Legislation is enacted by popularly-elected representatives responding to public pressure. That
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that the jury decides the law, as well as the facts of the case.' 9 The

jury is free, in a sense, to make law because it has the power to interpret and apply the law in light of the factors present in the particular
case.' Thus, when the jury applies abstract rules of law to the facts

before it, a jury may disregard the letter of the law in order to mitigate
its harshness, thereby giving legal rules often-needed flexibility. The

jury's voice is significant because neither a court, a lawyer, nor a legislator can engage in the dialogue or discourse of adjudication without
responding to the pointed and potent arguments that the jury's decision projects.2 Only when it undersands that the jury's dialogue is
central to the question of adjudication can society begin to construct a
regulatory vision that is no longer myopic. 22 Thus, society must
legislation is then interpreted by the courts, which apply the enacted legislation to specific
factual situations. The courts' interpretation of enacted legislation, in turn, may engender
public disagreement and force the legislature to enact clarifying amendments to previously
enacted statutes. For an explanation of the role of constitutional adjudication as an on-going
dialogue in democracy, see Cover, The Bonds of ConstitutionalInterpretation: Of the Word,
the Deed, the Role, 20 GA. L. REV. 815 (1986).
This Comment asserts that the area of insider trading regulation is one of those opentextured areas of the law in which the indeterminacy of legal results requires a new weighingup of social values. Of course, even this assertion involves a value judgment. "The very task of
deciding whether we should reach a new weighing-up of social values involves... a weighingup of the same values." Stotzky & Swan, Due Process Methodology and PrisonerExchange
Treaties: Confronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 MINN. L. REV. 733, 759 n.70 (1978). The
only meaningful approach to this dilemma is to recognize that "[t]he process is inevitable and
continuous. It goes to the very heart of legal reasoning and cannot be confined but only
disciplined." Id.
19. See infra notes 336-83 and accompanying text. The presence of a jury opens the legal
discourse by making explanations and justifications necessary, and then subjecting those
explanations to questioning in the light of community values, thereby clarifying social policy.
Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 639, 652 (1981). In each case, the jury as a "group of problem-solvers...
bring[s], collectively, large amounts of information and experience to bear that a single
individual would not." Id. (footnote omitted). This phenomenon is what Professor Cover
refers to as "deliberative redundancy... a critical strategy in procedural systems for purposes
of confirming the 'correct' [outcome] and establishing the areas of uncertainty." Id. at 652,
654. Because "[a] principle function of syntactic redundancy is the identification of
problematic parts of a message," id., the jury, with its deliberative redundancy, should be able
to identify problematic areas of social policy regarding insider trading regulation. If, indeed,
insider trading is the troubled area that this Comment postulates, the presence of a jury will
help to identify the trouble spots.
20. On its face, this concept may be rejected as iconoclastic. Upon reflection, however, it
will become apparent that this idea is not as revolutionary as it may at first appear. Although
the judge instructs the jury on the applicable rules of law, it is the jury that must apply these
laws to the facts in order to arrive at a general verdict. Through the general verdict, the jury
can achieve a result without specifying its reasoning. See infra notes 341-42 and
accompanying text. In this process, the jury makes law in the individual case in order to
achieve its vision of justice. See Green, Juriesand Justice-The Jury's Role in PersonalInjury
Cases, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 152, 157.
21. See Green, supra note 20, at 165-66.
22. In the common law tradition, the jury performs two simultaneous functions: dispute
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incorporate the community's voice into the analytic framework of
securities regulation.23
This Comment examines the effects of the Tull decision in four
sections. Section II discusses the Court's opinion in Tull and assesses
some shortcomings in the Court's internal logic. Section III examines
the current regime of civil enforcement of insider trading prohibitions
under ITSA.24 Section IV then discusses the increasing divergence
between enunciated justifications for securities regulation and the perresolution, which refers to the jury's role in solving the controversy at hand, and norm
articulation, which incorporates community mores into the decision making process. Thus,
[a]djudication in the common law mold entails two simultaneously performed
functions: dispute resolution and norm articulation. . .
For example, the
requirement of 'case and controversy' in the federal courts is a formal
embodiment of the requirement that the norm articulation function not be
performed apart from dispute resolution. The converse requirement may also be
found. . . . [The] requirement of articulation, together with even a weak
consistency requirement, over time, will necessarily entail the articulation of
general norms.
Cover, supra note 19, at 643 (footnote omitted). Although Professor Cover's point concerned
jurisdictional redundancy, rather than jury function, the jury performs an analogous redundant function, and community norms are reflected in their determination.
23. The political phenomenon of myopia occurs when people "refus[e] to engage in an
activity with long-term benefits because of short-term costs." Sunstein, Legal Interference with
PrivatePreferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1164 (1966). In the context of insider trading,
the government's justification for regulation rests on the implicit assumption that the collective
payoff in terms of the marketplace will be greater than the individual's costs in abstaining from
such behavior. "In deciding whether government action can be justified, [however] one should
ask whether consumers are ultimately worse off than they would have been" without the
government interference. Id. at 1159. Because "[e]fforts to overcome myopia tend to be large
intrusions" and the costs of reshaping preferences considerable, and because government
action to overcome myopia "is likely to be skewed by irrelevant or invidious factors . . .
government action to counteract myopia should be quite rare." Id. at 1165-66. In fact,
because the regulations do not take cost benefit analysis into account, they are themselves
myopic. Not only do the regulations attempt to restructure individual behavior that is
pervasive in society, but in doing so, they unfairly disadvantage those whose trading conduct
brings them within the SEC enforcement net by imposing upon them unequal bargaining
power and lack of procedural safeguards. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the regulations themselves are contraindicated by
economic theory. See infra notes 286-328 and accompanying text. Although the legislature
theoretically acts for the majority, "in a representative democracy, where citizens vote on
candidates rather than on issues and do not have continuous control over representative
processes, it is fanciful to say that government intrusion ... is always responsive to electoral
demand." Sunstein, supra, at 1144. Thus, permitting the community an added voice in the
application of insider trading regulations by subjecting the regulations to jury scrutiny is a
laudable development.
24. The jury is a remarkable institution that has achieved a rare prominence in the
American judicial system. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 n.1 (1966).
The judicial process reflects the "historic dualism between popular sovereignty and the
doctrine of fundamental law that developed with the birth throes of the American political
system." R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 14 (1960). This dualism is not
only responsible for the characteristically strong role of the judiciary in the United States, it
also establishes the principle that "public concurrence sets an outer boundary for judicial
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ceived reality of the marketplace, a divergence that is causing increasing cognitive dissonance. In light of empirical studies on jury
behavior, Section V speculates on the jury's effect on social policy
regarding insider trading. This Comment concludes that by including
the jury in the judicial process of insider trading litigation, the discourse has been altered in positive ways, whether a particular case is
tried or settled2 5 and whether the jury uses more or less stringent standards to assess liability. The possibility of a jury trial adds an important dimension to the legal discourse 26 and, hence, to social policy, 27
thus implementing the separation of powers doctrine by significantly
enhancing the role of community in judicial decisionmaking. 28
II. AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. TULL
A. The ProceduralBackground
In United States v. Tull, 29 the government brought a civil penalpolicy-making; that judicial ideas of the good society can never be too far removed from...

popular ideas." Id.at 22.
25. Professors Kalven and Zeisel's sociological studies show that the possibility of a jury
trial alters litigant's decisionmaking calculus, whether or not they go to trial. H. KALVEN &
H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 31-32.

26. Although the people's voice is theoretically heard through the legislative branch,
inclusion of the community voice in the judicial process further fine-tunes the system and adds

a redundant dimension similar to the role Professor Cover asserts for jurisdictional
redundancy. See generally Cover, supra note 19.
27. The formation of social policy in this country results from the same complex
interaction of normative and outcome specific dispute resolution that characterizes the
common law tradition. Stotzky & Swan, supra note 18, at 757. Professors Stotzky and Swan
believe that:
Social policies are a complex phenomenon. Descriptively, they consist of
statements of desired outcomes associated with particular situations. As pure
description, however, they are normatively neutral. Their normative content is
dependent upon some underlying ethical postulate or value that may be more or
less clearly expressed by the policymaker, whether legislative, executive, or
judicial. This means that when a case thought to engage a particular social
policy is decided, the policy functions in the nature of a principle.
Id at 758 n.66. Because the jury's perception of justice in a particular case may differ from the
judge's in precisely those cases in which the community norm differs from the official legal
policy, the institution of the jury becomes an important check on unwise legislation. See infra
notes 351-355 and accompanying text.
28. See supra notes 24 & 25-27. The jury is a key feature of the separation of powers
scheme, in which the power allocated among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches is
diffused through a system of checks and balances. See Note, United States v. Tull: The Right
to Jury Trial Under the Clean Water Act-The Jury is Still Out, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 665,
666, 688-89 (1987). The jury is able to function in this way because it acts as the only checkother than impeachment--on a potentially oppressive judiciary. Id. It also functions as a
check on unwise legislation, and it was this characteristic functional combination that
engendered the constitutional debates resulting in the ratification of the seventh amendment.
Id. at 688.
29. 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987).
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ties action against a real estate developer accused of violating the
Clean Water Act 30 by filling in wetlands property.31 The developer
did not deny having filled in the properties but contested their categorization as wetlands.32 The government sought both equitable and
monetary relief, and asked the judge to impose the maximum civil
penalty, over $22 million.3 3 Despite the government's admission that
there existed triable issues of fact regarding the composition and
nature of the fillings, the district court denied the developer's demand
for a jury trial and, after a trial to the court and a finding of liability,
fined the developer $325,000. 34 The United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit affirmed and expressly held that the right to
jury trial did not extend to civil penalties actions in which the statute
is silent regarding this right. 3" The Supreme Court, however, reversed
and held that the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial
applies to civil actions that seek to collect a civil penalty.36 The Court
reached this conclusion based on an historical analysis of the jurisdictional prerogatives of the courts of law and equity.37
30. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), prohibits,
among other things, dumping fill into wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 33 U.S.C
§§ 1311, 1344, 1362; 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(1)(7) (1986). Wetlands are defined as "swamps,
marshes, bogs" and other frequently inundated areas. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1986). Section
1319 provides for both injunctive relief, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), and civil penalties, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d). The statute is silent, however, regarding the right to jury trial. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court interpreted the act's legislative history as indicating that Congress
contemplated that the penalties would be assessed by the judge. See Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1839
(citing statement by Sen. Muskie that penalties would be assessed by judges in 123 CONG. REC.
39,190-91 (1977)).
31. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1833-34.
32. Id. at 1834.
33. Although the government asked for an injunction, most of the developer's property
had already been sold, making the requested injunction applicable to only a small proportion
of the land in question. Id. at 1834.
34. 615 F. Supp. 610, 626 (E.D. Va. 1983).
35. United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit based its
denial of the right to jury trial on an historical analysis. Id. at 186. First, the court concluded
that the Clean Water Act was an "equitable" statute. Id. at 186-87. Second, the court found
that civil penalties under the Clean Water Act were not remedies "at law," but were within the
court's equitable discretion. Id. at 187. Third, the court found that because the Clean Water
Act offers a "package" of both legal and equitable remedies, the civil penalties lose whatever
legal character they might otherwise have possessed. Id. at 187.
36. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835. The Supreme Court explicitly granted certiorari in order to
resolve the question left open in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (1977), of whether "the seventh amendment's guarantee of the
right to jury trial applies to civil actions to collect a civil penalty." Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835.
37. The Court found that although the seventh amendment applies to actions that are
analogous to suits at common law, "those actions that are analogous to 18th-century cases
tried in courts of equity or admiralty do not require a jury trial." Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835.
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B.

The Supreme Court's HistoricalAnalysis

The seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States

requires that "[iln suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be

preserved." 3 It, therefore, protects the right to jury trial only in
actions "at law," and not those in equity.39 Moreover, because the
seventh amendment uses the word "preserved," the Supreme Court,
in Tull, unanimously based its decision on the traditional historical
analysis of the kinds of suits that could properly be brought in 18th-

century English law courts. 4°
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

39. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835. The Court explicitly extended the definition of "at law" in the
seventh amendment to congressionally-created causes of action, as well as to common law
forms of action. Id.
40. Id. Justice Scalia, although dissenting in part, found the majority's use of historical
analysis correct. Id. at 1841 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although
far from lacking in precedent, this approach is inconsistent with the social underpinnings of
the case. Courts have consistently applied a historical analysis to determine whether there
exists a right to a jury trial in a civil action since United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745
(C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750), was decided. More recent cases include Parklane Hosiery v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (Procedural changes occurring after 1791 do not affect seventh
amendment rights.); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 463 (1974) (The jury issue must be
resolved on the basis of whether the action was historically at law or in equity.); Dairy Queen
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (The proper focus of the historical analysis is on the remedy.);
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (Each issue presented must be analyzed,
and a historical analysis performed, to determine whether the issue is legal or equitable in
nature, and hence, whether it would have been afforded a jury trial in 1791.).
The Court's historical approach, however, obscures the reality of modem jurisprudence,
which has abandoned the distinction between courts of law and equity and merged them into a
single system. The federal court's procedural merger of law and equity, see FED. R. Civ. P. 1,
2, occurred in 1938 with the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to
congressional authorization. Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). It seems irrational
for modern courts deciding modern issues in a merged law and equity system to base their
determinations of the right to jury trial on whether the l8th-century English judicial system
would have found jurisdiction for problems that probably would not have arisen then in either
law or in equity. Many of the cases raising the jury right question arise in contexts that could
not have been contemplated in 18th-century England. The modem world vision has
completely changed, however, and attempts to see the world through ancient glasses can only
warp the vision. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 19passim (1984). For
example, the decision as to whether to extend the right to a jury trial to insider trading actions,
a problem Congress expressly left to judicial resolution, see H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1983), hardly could have arisen in the 18th-century because there was no
contemporaneous analogue to our current stock market. See R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 11.
Although civil penalties were familiar to 18th-century England and America, see Wolfram,
The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 670 (1973),
attempts to discover whether a particular issue-remedy would have been decided at law or in
equity is bound to yield highly indeterminate results. See Note, supra note 28, at 686. Equity
evolved, at least partly, as an adjunct judicial system to relieve the harshness of the forms of
action at law. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 123-37 (1908).
Categorization of which cases could be brought in which system was often highly arbitrary.
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In order to determine whether the seventh amendment's right to
jury trial applied to the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court, in Tull,
applied a two-pronged test: First, it examined the nature of the
action, and second, it examined the nature of the remedy. 4 ' In applying this two-pronged test, however, the Court specified that the search
must be for "a single historical analogue," with reference to 18thcentury English practice. 42 Thus, the Court required both the action
and the remedy to be defined in light of 18th-century practice: the
action, to determine where jurisdiction might have been found, and
the remedy,
to determine whether it is more "legal or equitable in
43
nature."
Applying this two-pronged test, the Court found that the civil
penalties action was "clearly analogous to the 18th-century action in
debt," which had traditionally required a jury trial." The government had argued that an equitable action to abate a public nuisance,
which traditionally did not require a jury trial, was the closer analogue to an action for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act.4 5
The Court disagreed, however, and held that even if this were so,
See Note, supra note 28, at 686. Furthermore, the categorizations were jurisdictionally based,
and these jurisdictional distinctions have little relevancy since the procedural merger of the
two systems. See id.
This analysis does not suggest that all constitutional historical analogy is inappropriate.
Rather, in the context of deciding the seventh amendment right to jury trial, the determination
of the law and equity distinction during the 18th-century, as perceived by a modem judicial
system that has merged the two, seems inapt. A more reasoned analysis would assess the
function of the jury in terms of its constitutional function-to assure a community voice in the
judicial process, thus furthering the separation of powers principle of a participatory
democracy. See id. at 665-69, 685-91.
41. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835.
42. Id. at 1837 n.6. The Court found that the government's attempt to analyze the
historical analogue of the action separately from the remedy was a "novel approach," and
summarily rejected it. Id. Instead, the Court emphasized that the search must be for a single
historical analogue, one that encompasses both the nature of the cause of action and the
remedy as important factors. Id.
43. Id. at 1835. First, the Court compared the statutory action for civil penalties under
the Clean Water Act to analagous 18th-century actions to determine whether they were
brought under the jurisdiction of the courts of law or equity. Id. at 1835. The remedy
determination could then be made on a similar basis. Id. It is unclear, however, how one
should proceed if the result points in two different directions. The government's argument
that both remedy and action must have been within the jurisdiction of the courts of law in
order for the right to jury trial to attach was summarily dismissed. Id. at 1837 n.6.
44. Id. at 1837. The Court was persuaded that a civil penalty suit was within the
jurisdiction of the courts of law prior to the enactment of the seventh amendment. Id. at 1836.
After its adoption, the federal courts followed the English common law custom by treating
civil penalty suits as actions in debt that required a jury trial. Id. The Court, therefore, held
that under the historical analysis, actions brought by the government to recover civil penalties
require a trial by jury. Id.
45. The Court found this position "debatable." Id. at 1837.
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characterizing the relief was the more important inquiry.46

In characterizing the relief of civil penalties as one at law, the
Court determined that civil penalties "could only be enforced in
courts of law" because they were punitive rather than compensatory
in nature, and therefore, they were not issued by the courts at
equity. 7 Thus, the Court concluded that civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act were legal rather than equitable because they sought
more than a mere restoration of the status quo.4 The Court summarily disposed of the government's argument that courts in equity were
traditionally able to assess monetary awards if they were "incidental
to or intertwined with injunctive relief."'49 Instead, the Court con-

cluded that even if "a court in equity [was permitted to] award monetary restitution as an adjunct to injunctive relief, it [was], not
[permitted to] enforce civil penalties." 5 Therefore, if the government
wants to keep a jury out of the deliberations, it is free to bring a separate equitable suit for injunction.5 1 On the other hand, if, as in Tull,
the government seeks both legal and equitable relief in the same suit,
all the issues common to both claims must be tried to a jury.52
46. Id. Nonetheless, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that it is improper to
divide "the Clean Water Act action for civil penalties into a cause of action and a remedy, and
[Rather, the] search is for a
analyze[s] each component as if the other were irrelevant ....
single historical analogue, taking into consideration the nature of the cause of action and the
remedy as two important factors." Id. at 1837 n.6. This reasoning may strike the reader as
somewhat confusing, circular, result-oriented, and even vaguely akin to the Red Queen's
discourse with Alice. See L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND, in THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF LEWIS CARROLL 84-95 (Random House ed. 1937). The reader is asked to bear in mind
that by insisting on a historical analysis, the Court is forced to labor under archaic concepts of
the forms of action at common law and equity jurisdiction, concepts that are no longer familiar
to a judicial system that merged the two over fifty years ago. For further discussion on this
anomaly, see supra note 40.
47. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1838. Interestingly, at this point in the opinion, the Court cited
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), to support the proposition that civil penalties actions
are actions at law. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1838. Ross held that the treble damages remedy for
securities violations is a -penalty that constitutes legal relief. Ross, 396 U.S. at 536. Thus,
under the Court's reasoning, civil penalties sought for securities violations should also be
triable to a jury. The Court clearly analogized statutory civil penalties to the remedy of
punitive damages. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1838. Therefore, civil penalties actions are within the
seventh amendment right to jury trial. Id. The Court also based its assessment on the
legislative history that suggested that "Congress wanted the district court to consider the need
for retribution and deterrence, in addition to restitution, when it imposed civil penalties." Id
48. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1839.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. This portion of the Court's holding may be especially important to actions for civil
penalties under the securities laws. Under ITSA, the SEC normally seeks a permanent
injunction, together with civil penalties. Levine, Mathews & Citera, Insider Trading: Recent
Enforcement Developments and Methods to Prevent Abuses, in PRAC. L. INST., SECURITIES
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 243 (1987).
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The Separation of Action and Remedy

Although the Court focused on the type of remedy that the government requested in determining that a civil penalties action is triable to a jury, it is ironic that the Court did not extend this right to
the remedy phase of the trial.5 3 In civil jury practice, the court traditionally assigns both the liability and the damage determinations to
the jury.5 4 The majority, instead, concluded that because civil penalties are "highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple factors," and because they are "the kind of calculations
traditionally performed by judges," the jury should not make that
determination." Moreover, the majority concluded that "a determination of a civil penalty is not an essential function of a jury trial,"
and that it is not one of those "incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by
jury."56 Thus, the Court's holding is more analogous to criminal
practice, in which the jury determines guilt and the judge determines
the sentence."' The Court justified its departure from traditional civil
practice by arguing that Congress "may fix the civil penalties [itself,
or it] may delegate that determination to trial judges. ' 58 The Court
determined that Congress had delegated the authority to fix civil penalties to the trial judges in the Clean Water Act.59 Although the language of the Clean Water Act is silent on the jury trial issue, the Act's
legislative history infers that judges are authorized to make the penalty calculations.'
Although he concurred that a jury trial should be afforded in
53. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1839-40.
54. Id. at 1841 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra note 61.
55. Id. at 1840. This rationale seems to assert that the jury is functionally incapable of
complex determinations, a rationale that the empirical data on the jury does not support. See,
e.g., Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1066 (1964) (Statistically, the
disagreement pattern between judge and jury does not vary in more difficult cases.). For a
discussion of the fallacy of the assumption that "traditionally"-historically-judges have
been regarded as superior decision makers in complex cases, see generally Arnold, A Historical
Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829
(1980) (There is no adequate historical foundation for denying a jury trial in complex cases.).
56. Tull, 107 S.Ct. at 1840.
57. Id. at 1841.
58. Id. at 1840.
59. Id.
60. To legitimate its removing the quantity determination from the jury, the Court used a
statement in the legislative history that does not address the issue of the assignment of penalty
determinations either to the judge or to the jury, but merely assumes that judges will make the
amount determination. Id. at 1839. The statement read: "Penalties assessed by judges should
be sufficiently higher than penalties to which the Agency would have agreed in settlement to
encourage violators to settle." 123 CONG. REc. 39,190-91 (1971) (remarks of Senator
Muskie). From this isolated statement alone, the Court inferred that "Congress intended that
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civil penalties actions, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's
withdrawal of the amount determination from the jury, calling this a
total departure from existing precedent.61 Justice Scalia remarked
that if criminal trials were to be the model, a criminal standard of
proof-guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-should be applied by the
62
jury.
Removing the remedy determination from the jury because it is
not a "fundamental element of a jury trial, ' 63 without defining either
what the fundamental elements of a jury trial are, or what the "substance of a common-law right to a trial by jury" 64 consists, is troubling. The Court thereby removed an important area of jury discretion
without engaging in the reasoned analysis necessary to clarify the
law.65
D.

The Effects of Tull

Although Tull originally attracted little attention outside of environmental circles, it has become a landmark decision with extraordinary ramifications. A narrow reading of Tull holds that the right to
jury trial only applies to civil penalties actions under the Clean Water
Act. Tull's broad language and constitutional basis, however, suggest
that other statutory civil penalties actions must also be tried to a
jury66 because they, like the civil penalties obtainable under the Clean
trial judges perform the highly discretionary calculations necessary to award civil penalties
after liability is found." Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1839 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 1841 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia cited
no precedent himself. Id. Rather, he asserted that punitive damages, which the majority
analogized to civil penalties, were assessed by the jury. Id. Further, Justice Scalia pointed out
that there is "no precedent for judgment of civil liability by a jury but assessment of amount by
the court." Id. at 1840-41. Indeed, the majority cited no precedent for this proposition,
concluding instead that "no evidence [exists] that the Framers meant to extend the right to a
jury to the remedy phase of a civil trial." Id. at 1840. This is a rather incongruous position for
the Court to take, in light of the admittedly sparse evidence of the framers' intent regarding the
analysis of actions contemplated to fall within the rubric of the seventh amendment's
protection, apart from the words of the amendment itself that to be accorded the right, the
actions should be "at law."
62. Justice Scalia argued that if criminal trials are the model, the liability determination
should use the higher standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applicable to criminal trials,
rather than the civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1841 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 1840.
64. Id.
65. In USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988), for example, the jury found that the
defendants were liable for breach of contract, but assessed damages at only one dollar. Id. at
1376-77. Thus, the jury was able to fine-tune its determination to achieve a just result. By
removing the penalties determination, the Tull Court removed an important area of jury
discretion.
66. The Court addressed the general statutory remedy of civil penalties and determined
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Water Act, are analogous to the actions in debt that were within the
jurisdiction of the 18th-century courts of law. 61
When the statutory remedy of civil penalties seeks to do more
than restore the status quo-such as when a statute seeks to punish
the offender, rather than merely enjoin him or force him to disgorge
his profits-civil penalties are properly considered legal in nature and
bring the remedy within the ambit of the seventh amendment right to
jury trial. 68 The Supreme Court in Tull, therefore, legitimized the
increased use of the jury as an institution. In a strange twist on this
theme, however, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the jury's
function because the Court refused to permit it to calculate the appropriate amount of the penalty.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tull has profoundly affected
the jurisprudence of several areas of the law. Statutory civil penalties
actions encompass some of the most volatile and controversial legal
areas. 69 Twenty-seven federal departments and agencies enforce
approximately 348 statutes involving civil penalties, penalties that are
ultimately collected through a civil action in a federal district court.70
Although previously it was uncertain whether statutory civil penalties
actions could be tried to a jury, the Supreme Court's holding in Tull
makes it abundantly clear that such actions must be tried to a jury if
demand is made, at least for the liability determination. By extension,
this should be true not only for actions brought under the Clean
Water Act, but for any actions brought by the government that seek
civil penalties. 7
that the seventh amendment applied to actions seeking such a remedy. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at
1835.
67. Id. at 1836.
68. Id. at 1838.
69. In addition to environmental actions, such as those brought under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), examples of statutes
that provide for civil penalties actions, that presumably now include the right to jury trial are:
Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1824 (Supp. IV 1986)); Insider Trading Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98
Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986)); and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1606 (1970) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
70. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1437-38 (1979).
71. The Supreme Court held that government civil penalties actions are analogous to
actions in debt requiring trial by jury. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1836. Although the Tull Court
decided only the case before it-civil penalties brought under the Clean Water Act-because
the Court based its holding on constitutional interpretation, and not merely statutory
construction, it implicitly extended the seventh amendment right to jury trial to other civil
penalties actions.
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III.

THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF

1984

A. Statutory Provisions
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) is prominent
72
among statutes authorizing the government to seek civil penalties.
ITSA resulted from the SEC's lobbying of Congress in 1982 for
increased enforcement powers73 and was enacted to curb perceived
securities abuses by anyone "purchas[ing] or sell[ing] a security while
in possession of material nonpublic information."'7 Although labeled
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, the title may be something of a
misnomer because it extends liability not only to traditional corporate
insiders, but to anyone who trades on material nonpublic information.7 The statute authorizes the imposition of a "civil penalty... [in
an amount that] shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss
avoided" by the trading activity.76 The statute further provides for
77
increased criminal fines.
ITSA, however, is silent on the right to jury trial. 8 Congress
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. 111984 & Supp. IV 1986). As this article goes to
press, ITSA has been strengthened, and its remedial provisions enhanced, by the enactment of
new law. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (to be codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). This new law
not only "expose[s] Wall Street firms to greater liability in insider trading cases but will
provide bounty payments to informers and require brokerage firms to police their employees."
Nash, Stiffer Penaltieson Insider Trades and Rewards for Informers Voted, N.Y. Times, Oct.
23, 1988, at 1, col. 4. Under the criminal provisions of the new law, individuals can be jailed
for 10 years for each violation, and criminal fines are increased to $1 million. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78fif(a) (as amended); see 134 CONG. REC. S17218-01 (daily ed. October 21, 1988) (statement
of Sen. Proxmire). But one of the most dramatic effects that the bill is intended to have-and
for this article, the most pertinent-is the imposition of civil penalties under ITSA. "H.R.
5133 expands the category of persons subject to ITSA civil penalties. It permits actions for
penalties against controlling persons who fail to take appropriate steps to prevent or detect
insider trading violations by their employees or controlled persons." Id. (statement of Sen.
Heinz). Thus, this bill represents the first time that liability has been extended to securities
firms and their controlling persons who "knowingly and recklessly fail to supervise their
employees." Nash, supra, at 15, col. 6. The new legislation, therefore, significantly enhances
the regulatory scheme of ITSA.
73. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
75. ITSA "should have been labeled the 'Outsider Trading Sanctions Act' since it was
primarily inspired by the trading of persons with advance knowledge of takeover attempts or
'market information'.., and not by any increase in trading by 'insiders.'" R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1053-54 (6th ed. 1987).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
77. Section 3 of ITSA amended Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act, and increased the maximum
criminal penalties for insider trading violations to $100,000. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 17 (1983).
78. Although the House Committee refused to provide a right to jury trial under the Act,
see H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983), the decision of the Supreme Court, in
Tull, mandates application of the seventh amendment right to jury trial in government civil
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instead addressed the issue in the legislative history, where it stated
that the right to jury trial under ITSA "should remain solely a question of constitutional law." 79 Although Congress expressed no view
on the proper resolution of the right to jury trial concerning liability
determinations under ITSA, it explicitly refused to extend the right to
jury trial to the penalty determination phase of civil enforcement
actions.80 Thus, the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Tull,
extending the seventh amendment right to jury trial to the liability
phase but not the penalty phase of government civil penalties actions,
is directly consistent with both ITSA and its legislative history.
1.

STATUTORY PENALTIES

ITSA permits the SEC or the court to set the amount of the penalty in "light of the facts and circumstances," as long as the amount
does not exceed triple the profits made or losses avoided by the illegal
trading."1 The penalty is payable to the United States Treasury. 2
penalties actions. See Tull, 107 S.Ct. at 1835 n.3. "Nothing in the language of the Clean
Water Act or its legislative history implies any Congressional intent to grant defendants the
right of a jury trial." Id. Thus, because Congress did not expressly grant the right to jury trial
in the Clean Water Act, the Court had to reach the constitutional question of whether a right
to jury trial must be provided, id., a question that it answered in the affirmative. Id. Similarly,
congressional failure to grant a jury trial for the civil penalties determination under ITSA is
not dispositive on the issue of whether the right to jury trial is implicit in the action. Rather,
as a matter of constitutional law, a jury trial must be provided.
79. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983). Thus, because the Supreme Court
determined, in Tull, that as a matter of constitutional law, civil penalties actions, such as those
brought under the Clean Water Act, must be tried to a jury, Tull, 107 S.Ct. at 1839, civil
actions brought under ITSA must also be tried to a jury.
80. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983). Although the Committee
expressly declined to express a view on the proper resolution of the constitutional issue, id., it
did note that "any right to a jury trial would not extend to a determination of the amount of
the penalty to be assessed." Id. This corresponds closely to the Supreme Court's conclusion,
in Tull, that the liability determination was triable to a jury, but that the penalty assessment
was not. Tull, 107 S.Ct. at 1840.
81. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983). The congressional section-bysection analysis states:
Section 2 of the bill amends section 21(d) of the Exchange Act by adding a new
subparagraph (d)(2)(A) to give the commission authority to seek from a U.S.
district court a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of profit gained or
loss avoided by a person who violates or aids and abets a violation of, the federal
securities laws by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material
nonpublic information.
Id. (emphasis added). This limitation, however, may be illusory. The defendant in an insider
trading case may also be subject to an additional 300% penalty in a civil RICO action under
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) brought by either the Department of Justice
or by private parties. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See J. SCHNOPP, H. PITT,
D. JOHNSON & G. COST, RICO LIABILITY 8 (1988) [hereinafter RICO LIABILITY] (Racketeering activity under § 1961 includes securities fraud.).
82. RICO LIABILITY, supra note 81, at 17.
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ITSA provides no guidelines for determining the amount of any
fines 3 that the SEC may seek or the court may impose, nor does it
limit other remedies that may be sought. 4 Indeed, one person's payment of these fines does not preclude similar or additional payment
from any other person involved in the illegal trading.85
The SEC has sought civil penalties in nearly all insider trading
cases, 6 including the cases it has settled. 7 Before the passage of
83. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and its Effect on Existing Law,
1986-87 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 87, 94 (1985). The SEC has not provided any guidelines as to

when it will seek a civil penalty under ITSA or how much it will seek. ITSA only specifies that
the amount should be calculated "in light of the facts and circumstances." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2)(D) (Supp. II 1984 & Supp. IV 1986). To date, there has been no judicial
development of the facts and circumstances that a court should consider before imposing the
penalty. Thus, disgorgement may be sought at the same time as the 300% penalty, raising the
amount of the fine to 400%. In addition, penalties under other sections of the 1934 Act may
be sought in tandem with ITSA penalties. For a discussion of this problem, see Levine,
Mathews & Citera, supra note 52, at 286.
84. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983). The Act does not "bar or limit"
any actions under any other provision "of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(D) (Supp. II &
Supp. IV 1986). This provision may involve liability under other sections of the 1934 Act,
such as § 16; it may also include criminal sanctions. See Langevoort, supra note 83. The
statute provides a five year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(D). See Levine,
Mathews & Citera, supra note 52, at 288 (The SEC may seek an injunction, ancillary relief
including disgorgement, a civil penalty, or any combination of these remedies.).
85. 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (floor statement by Rep. Dingell
clarifying the Senate amendments to which the House agreed).
86. See Levine, Mathews & Citera, supra note 52, at 286.
87. Pitt, Ain & Snyder, Liabilityfor Insider Trading under the FederalSecurities Laws, in
PRAC. L. INST., SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 171 (1987). Agency discretion in

setting the fine may be a critical piece of leverage that the SEC can use to achieve a quick
settlement. For example, many of the cases settled via a consent decree were settled for less
than the 300% maximum. See, e.g., SEC v. Cochran, No. C87-1352 (W.D. Wash. October 9,
1987), Litigation Release No. 11572 (Vice president of subsidiary who traded on material
nonpublic information that subsidiary would be spun off from parent consented to an
injunction, disgorgement of $24,498, and an ITSA civil penalty of $24,498.); SEC v. Chestman
and Loeb, No. 87 Civ. 7148 (RJW) (S.D.N.Y. October 6, 1987), Litigation Release No. 11571
(Broker-dealer and businessman faced with insider trading charges in connection with A & P's
tender offer for Waldbaum consented, without admission or denial of allegations, to a
permanent injunction, disgorgement of $22,653, and an ITSA civil penalty of $22,653.); SEC v.
Kidder Peabody, Civil Action No. 3869 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1987), Litigation Release No.
11452 (Investment bank alleged to have traded in securities while in possession of material
nonpublic information and parking securities for entities controlled by Ivan Boesky,
consented, without admission or denial of allegations, to a permanent injunction, disgorgement
of $13,676,101 and an ITSA civil penalty of $11,618,674- twice the profits the SEC claimed it
had made from the transactions.); SEC v. Moore, Civil Action No. N 86 PCD (D. Conn. filed
March 3, 1986) (Psychiatrist was accused of trading on information obtained from patient who
was the spouse of a takeover target official. The psychiatrist consented, without admission or
denial of allegations, to a permanent injunction, disgorgement of $26,933, and an ITSA civil
penalty of $26,933.); SEC v. Elliot, No. 86 Civ. 10184 (N.D. Ill. filed December 30, 1986),
Litigation Release No. 11335 (Partner of Chicago law firm charged with entering six
transactions while in possession of information misappropriated from clients of law firm
consented, without admission or denial of allegations, to a permanent injunction, disgorgement
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ITSA, the inside trader could be penalized-other than by injunction
or disgorgement of profits-only after a criminal conviction in a trial
attended by the constitutional protections afforded in all criminal trials.88 Under ITSA, however, penalties may be exacted following civil
enforcement proceedings that lack these constitutional safeguards.8 9
of $271,312, and an ITSA civil penalty of $228,688.); SEC v. Pomerantz, No. 86 Civ. 9499
(PNL) (S.D.N.Y. filed December 11, 1986), Litigation Release No. 11305 (Texas businessman
was charged with misappropriating information from a person involved in a buyout and
passing the information to his mother-in-law, consented to a permanent injunction,
disgorgement of his and his mother-in-law's profits of $39,925, and an ITSA civil penalty of
$79,850.); SEC v. David, No. 86 Civ. 9462 (DNE) (S.D.N.Y. filed December 8, 1986),
Litigation Release No. 11334 (Attorney with Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison
admitted to disclosure 'of material nonpublic information obtained from law firm and
consented to a permanent injunction, disgorgement of $50,000, and an ITSA civil penalty of
up to $100,000, depending on his future income.); SEC v. Boesky, No. 86 Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y.
filed November 14, 1986), Litigation Release No. 11288 (Arbitrageur charged with violating
Sections 10(b) and 14(e) and Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3 by trading in material nonpublic
information obtained in exchange for $2.4 million consented to a permanent injunction,
disgorgement of $50 million, and an ITSA civil penalty of $50 million.); SEC v. Sokolow, No.
86 Civ. 5193 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1986) (Vice president of investment banking firm, charged
with leaking material nonpublic information regarding clients to Dennis Levine in return for
$120,000, consented to a permanent injunction, disgorgement of $120,000, and an ITSA civil
penalty of $90,000.); SEC v. Wilkis, No. 86 Civ. 5182 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1986), Litigation
Release No. 11605 (Former investment banker with Lazard Freres and Co., later vice
president of mergers and acquisitions at E.F. Hutton & Co., charged with trading on
information either misappropriated from employers or received from Dennis Levine,
consented to a permanent injunction, disgorgement of $3 million, and an ITSA civil penalty of
$300,000.); SEC v. Levine, No. 86 Civ. 3726 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. filed May 12, 1986), Litigation
Release No. 11605 (Director of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., and his accountant, were
charged with insider trading; director consented to a permanent injunction and disgorgement
of $11.6 million, and the accountant was ordered to disgorge illegal profits and pay an ITSA
civil penalty.). Although the accused inside trader in each of the above cases neither admitted
nor denied the allegations brought by the SEC, all consented to permanent injunctions, to
disgorgement of "profits," and to the payment of civil penalties that were highly variable in
amount.
88. In civil insider trading, the SEC imposes sanctions after a civil enforcement proceeding
that is conducted "without the full panoply of protections offered a criminal defendant."
Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A CriticalAssessment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 962. In criminal insider trading actions, after the SEC has
conducted an investigation and has alleged conduct that may give rise to criminal liability, the
Department of Justice must file formal charges and submit the case for trial. Id. Although the
SEC may conduct criminal investigations, the Department of Justice retains authority over the
criminal indictment process. Id. A notable difference between criminal and civil insider
trading cases is the higher burden of proof required for conviction in criminal cases. In
criminal prosecutions, the insider trader must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
while in civil actions, only a preponderance of the evidence is necessary for a finding of civil
liability. Id. In either the civil or the criminal context, however, circumstantial evidence is all
that is required for a liability determination. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375 (1983) (Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for liability in a private action under lOb-

5.).
89. The Commission may bring an action to seek a civil penalty when it believes insider
trading violations have occurred. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
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ITSA's impact extends far beyond the stated penalties. The mere
commencement of an informal investigation by the SEC may be sufficient to cause extreme hardship to the subject of such an investigation.90 The investigative process can irreparably damage the
employment relationships and the business goodwill of those investigated because of the attendant publicity that results when the SEC
files a complaint or administrative order. 91 This publicity 92 may also

trigger private suits that could result in potentially draconian damage
awards.93 Moreover, findings of fact from enforcement proceedings,
but not from consent decrees, 94 operate as collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation.9" Thus, these factors give the SEC an enormous
advantage in any settlement negotiations.96
Furthermore, insider trading violations are often investigated
without procedural safeguards. 97 The SEC's extremely broad investiBefore Congress enacted ITSA, only the Department of Justice could bring an action seeking
monetary fines for securities violations. See Silver, supra note 88, at 962.
90. See, e.g., Report of the Task Force on SEC Rules, supra note 11.
91. Id at 791.
92. Id. Publicity, of course, may not be the fault of the SEC; rather, it may result either
from information leaks or from the target's own actions. In any event, such publicity may
trigger private suits-a result that may have severe consequences for the target.
93. There is a private right of action under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-81 n.10 (1983); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 733-34 (1975); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). This private right of action under the
securities fraud provisions has been called "illogical" because it allows people who would have
traded anyway and who have not been injured to litigate and possibly recover large damage
awards. See, e.g., Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 79, 105 (1987); Chiang & Bottorff, Boesky Scandal May Lead to Rush of Civil
Lawsuits, Los Angeles Daily J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (Boesky scandal may lead to rush of
civil lawsuits and class actions.). The threat of draconian damages from private litigation adds
considerably to the SEC's leverage in obtaining consent decrees. See, e.g., Wolfson, A Critique
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119, 161 passim (1981).
94. A consent decree is a form of remedy used by the SEC in which the "defendant," who
neither admits nor denies the charges that the SEC has brought against him, agrees to an
injunction barring him from further illicit activity and to the payment of fines. See Kronstein,
SEC Practice, 11 SEc. REG. L.J. 284 (1983) (A large majority of SEC actions are settled by the
entry of consent injunctions.).
95. See, e.g., Kerr & Stillman, supra note 11, at 485 (A victory by the SEC in an
enforcement proceeding will have collateral estoppel consequences in a later private damages
action.). The Commission's determination in the enforcement proceedings, if unsuccessfully
defended in the district court, can bar the defendant from relitigating issues decided in the
enforcement proceedings. The inherent impossibility of predicting in advance how the
estoppel issue will look to a court in a subsequent action enhances this problem. Id.
96. Report of the Task Force on SEC Rules, supra note 11, at 791 (The investigation is
generally the only opportunity the defendant has to present his side because most enforcement
actions are settled.).
97. The current rules do not provide adequate assurance that the defendant or his counsel
will have sufficient information about the staff's view of the factual or legal bases of the case.
Furthermore, in spite of consistent rhetoric to the effect that SEC investigative proceedings are
not adversarial, these proceedings have significant ramifications to the targets of an
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gative powers may promote speed and efficiency in the investigative
process, but they may also result in substantial unfairness to the subject of an investigation. 98 The targets of SEC investigations often are
not given sufficient warning to afford them the opportunity to prepare
a proper defense. 99 Many SEC practices are unwritten and, thus, are
"not ...readily accessible to those witnesses and their counsel who
must appear before the SEC in investigations. '""oo Moreover, the few
written rules that do exist are inadequate to assure due process, let
alone fundamental fairness. 101 For example, even in formal investigations,' 02 the SEC is not required to provide transcripts of testimony
that assure an adequate record for subsequent review.' 03 All of these
factors give the SEC a substantial advantage in settlement negotiations and have the potential to make the application of insider trading
legislation substantially unfair to those caught in the net of SEC
enforcement proceedings.
investigation. Id. at 769. Therefore, the task force concluded that targets should be given
advance warning that they are the subject of an investigation. Id.
98. See, e.g., Report of the Task Force on SEC Rules, supra note 11, at 791. The Task
Force noted many inconsistencies between SEC investigations and notions of due process. Id.
One of the due process insufficiencies noted was an infringement upon the right to counsel. Id.
at 795. The current SEC rules limit the role and activities of an attorney present at the
examination of a witness to taking notes and briefly questioning the witness at the conclusion
of the examination for clarification of any answers given. Id. The rules further provide for the
sequestration and disciplining of counsel for any dilatory or obstructive conduct. Id. The
Task Force pointed out that these disciplinary provisions may have a substantial chilling effect
on the vigorous representation of counsel. Id. Some authorities take the position that these
rules are not enforced, although they are on the books, and that they, therefore, should not be
considered as troubling as they would be if enforced with regularity. See Letter of Harvey L.
Pitt, at 9 (on file at the University of Miami Law Review). It is potentially chilling,
nonetheless, to have bad law on the books, even if the practical consequences are not as serious
as the theoretical ones.
99. Although the SEC staff routinely advises witnesses and counsel that there are no
targets in SEC investigations, the reality is that such proceedings are adversarial, and
therefore, the targets should be given ample warning. Report of the Task Force on SEC Rules,
supra note 11, at 796.
100. Id.at 791.
101. SEC investigations are sufficiently adversarial to make abuse of prosecutorial authority
a valid concern, especially since the "SEC investigative process lacks sufficient procedures to
assure that all subjects and witnesses are treated fairly." Id.
102. The SEC conducts two types of investigation, formal and informal. In informal
investigations, the SEC requests "voluntary" cooperation, rather than issuing subpoenas as it
does in formal investigations. Id. at 792. Only formal investigations are currently subject to
the rules relating to investigations. Id.
103. Id. at 813. The SEC has the power to withhold transcripts and to require the target's
attorney to read them in the office of the SEC. Id. Although the SEC rarely withholds
transcripts in practice, this power could be abused by a less enlightened staff and is, therefore,
troubling in theory, if not in practice.
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2.

STATUTORY LIABILITY

4

ITSA applies to "any person [who] purchas[es] or sell[s] a security while in possession of material nonpublic information."''10 Thus,
ITSA may impose sanctions for any violation of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) that involves
trading. 105 This prohibition against possession and use of material
nonpublic information includes options and other derivative instruments, 1° as well as any securities traded "on or through the facilities
of a national securities exchange or from or through a broker or
dealer,"'0 7 unless the securities were part of a public offering. 0 8 Furthermore, any person "aiding and abetting the violation" is similarly
liable."° ITSA, however, precludes liability "solely because that person aided and abetted a transaction ...

in a manner other than by

communicating material nonpublic information.""' This provision
protects brokers or dealers acting without knowledge that they are
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. Finally, the
statute limits the liability of employers so that "[n]o person shall be
liable . . . solely by reason of employing another person who is

liable." "'
Congress, however, explicitly declined to address the substantive
elements of an insider trading violation." 2 Rather, Congress decided
to rely on "the evolving case law under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and rule l0b-5, ' 113 implying an endorsement
of the judicial interpretation of these securities fraud regulations. "4
The securities fraud regulations that involve insider trading include
104. Kerr & Stillman, supra note 11, at 441.
105. Id. at 485.
106. Section 5 of ITSA amended Section 20 of the 1934 Act, and extended liability to
include tipping or trading in the options market. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986)). See Levine, Matthews &
Citera, supra note 52, at 288. Tipping is defined in ITSA's legislative history as
communicating material nonpublic information. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9

(1983).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
108. Id. The rationale for this provision is that deterrence in addition to that already
imposed under the 1934 Act was not necessary in face-to-face transactions or public offerings.
H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 26 (1983).
109. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 26 (1983).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
111. 15 U.S.C § 78u(d)(2)(B).
112. 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
113. 130 CONG. REc. H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
114. Langevoort, supra note 83, at 90. See Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REv. 455 (1985) (Reliance on case law in the legislative
history of ITSA suggests an implied endorsement of judicial interpretation of securities fraud.).
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Sections 10(b)". 5 and 14(e)' 1 6 of the 1934 Act, and Rules 10b-5117 and
14e-311 8 promulgated thereunder." 9 A violation of any of these Sec-

tions, therefore, is subject to sanctions under ITSA.
a.

20

Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule lOb-5 Promulgated Thereunder
Although the SEC and the courts have used both Section 10(b)

and Rule lOb-5 extensively for the prosecution of insider trading,
neither provision directly addresses insider trading.' 2 1 Until 1961,
only three cases imposed a duty by corporate insiders either to dis-

close material nonpublic information or to abstain from trading.

22

115. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).

117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3.
119. Langevoort, supra note 83, at 95.
120. For a discussion of the implications of this provision, see id.
121. Section 10(b) prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 10(b)
does not operate to prohibit any conduct unless the SEC has adopted special rules prohibiting
such conduct. Id. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange, (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). One problem with Rule lOb-5 is that it has been held to implement Section 10(b), including manipulative behavior, although Rule lOb-5 does not mention
the word manipulation. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
122. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943), was the first case in which the
SEC addressed Rule l0b-5. Two controlling officers bought shares in their own corporation
when they knew that a proposed merger would take place. Id. at 374-75. The SEC concluded
that the officers had violated Rule lob-5 by their actions. Id. at 381. Kardon v. National
Gypsum, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), was the first judicial decision on Rule lOb-5. Two
of four equal shareholders brought a private action against the other two co-equal
shareholders, alleging failure to disclose that the corporate assets had been sold pursuant to an
agreement made before the plaintiffs had sold their stock to the defendants. Id. at 800-01. The
district court held that that these actions consituted Rule lOb-5 securities violations for which
the two participating co-equal shareholders were liable. Id. at 802-03. An early leading case is
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), reaff'd, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D.
Del. 1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952), op. on damages, 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955),
modified, 235 F. 2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). In Speed, a majority shareholder was alleged to have
traded on information that the value of the corporation's inventory was greater than its
published book value. Id. at 812, 820. The shareholder was found liable for violating Rule
l0b-5. Id. at 843. There were also a number of early SEC injunctive actions. L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1449 (1961). The consensus, however, is that In re Cady Roberts,
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That year, in the seminal case of In re Cady Roberts & Co.,'"I the SEC
concluded that corporate insiders have a duty either to disclose material nonpublic information or to abstain from trading. 124 Cady Roberts & Co. involved an administrative disciplinary proceeding
concerning a stockbroker who traded on tipped information for his
customers' accounts. 12 5 A director of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, who was employed as a stockbroker at Cady Roberts & Co.,
disclosed nonpublic information concerning the reduction of CurtissWright's dividend to another stockbroker at the same brokerage
house.1 26 The SEC concluded that corporate insiders have a duty
either to disclose material nonpublic information or to abstain from
trading. 127 The Commission based its conclusion that a duty existed
on two elements: the special relationship that provides access to corporate information, and the inherent unfairness of an insider taking
advantage of information that is unavailable to other traders.'28 This
second element appears to envision a parity of access to information
standard for trading.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 12 9 the judiciary contributed to
the development of the SEC's abstain or disclose rule. In Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested, in dicta, that the duty either to disclose material nonpublic information or to abstain from trading applies to anyone in
possession of material nonpublic information, regardless of the existence of a special relationship that provides access to the information.130 This broad standard of liability remained in effect until 1980,
when the Supreme Court narrowed the applicability of the duty either
to disclose material nonpublic 3information or to abstain from trading
in Chiarella v. United States.1 '
The Supreme Court first issued an opinion on the issue of insider
trading in Chiarella.132 In Chiarella,the United States brought crimi40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), was the seminal case regarding insider trading, and it is so cited in
ITSA's legislative history. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983).
123. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
124. Id at 911.
125. Id.at 908.
126. Id.
127. Id at 911.
128. Id. at 912.
129. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
130. Id. at 848.
131. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
132. Although Chiarella was the Supreme Court's first explicit pronouncement on the
subject of insider trading, it was by no means the first time that the Court had dealt with cases
involving some form of insider trading. See, e.g. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (When an accounting firm failed to detect and disclose an insider's fraud to the SEC,
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nal charges against the employee of a financial printer. 133 The
employee guessed the identities of target companies from takeover
documents that the acquiring companies delivered to the printer and
then traded on that information before the corporations publicly
announced their takeover bids. 1 34 Chiarella, the employee, was con-

victed of securities law violations, 13 based on the theory that anyone-even those not possessing a special relationship--either must
36
disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from trading.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
Chiarella's conviction 37 and concluded that there was both a violation of the duty to disclose or abstain and a misappropriation of information that belonged to his employer. 3 The Second Circuit
reasoned that Chiarella breached a duty owed to the acquiring corporations not to disclose when he traded on the information he had
obtained through his employment by the financial printer.' 39 The
Second Circuit's theory of misappropriation, therefore, would hold
someone liable for fraud if that person converted confidential corpo-

rate information for personal gain. 14
the Court found that scienter was required for liability.); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (A private cause of action under Rule lob-5 may only be brought
by an actual purchaser or seller.); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)
(Market maker who induced trades by maintaining the market was found to be liable for
violating Rule lOb-5 when he failed to disclose this material information.); Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (Corporate insiders were found to
have defrauded the corporation where they engaged in an elaborate looting scheme in which
the corporation's United States Treasury Bonds were sold at full price and the proceeds were
used by the defendants to purchase the corporation's stock.); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (Construing § 206(2) of the Investment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6(2), the Court held that an investment advisor, who purchased stocks for his own
account prior to recommending them to his clients and then immediately sold the shares at a
profit upon the rise in market price following his recommendation, was liable for fraud under
the statute.); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382
U.S. 809 (1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 363 (1966) (Stockholder who filed derivative action against
hotel corporation for fraud on the basis of the corporation's purchase of its own stock at
inflated prices from corporate officers and directors was found to have no valid cause of action
because the verification of her complaint was false.).
133. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224-25.
134. Id. at 224.
135. Id at 225.
136. The jury had been instructed that Chiarella could be convicted if the jury found he
used information that was not available to other participants in the market. See id at 236.
137. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1368 n.15 (2d Cir. 1978).
138. Id. at 1368 n.14.
139. Id. at 235.
140. Justice Stevens' concurrence is often cited as support for the misappropriation theory.
See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 83, at 110. Justice Stevens found that "(a]rguably, when
petitioner [Chiarella] bought securities in the open market, he violated (a) a duty to disclose
owed to the sellers from whom he purchased target company stock and (b) a duty of silence
owed to the acquiring companies." Chiarella,445 U.S. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction and held that
a specific fiduciary relationship must exist before trading on material
nonpublic information can become a violation of Rule 10b-5. 4 ,
Because no such fiduciary relationship existed between Chiarella and
the people who sold securities to him, the Court held that he had not
committed securities fraud.142 The Court explicitly rejected the
notion of a general duty either to disclose material nonpublic informa14 3
tion or to abstain from trading.
The Court declined to address the misappropriation theory
because it had not been submitted to the jury.' 44 In his dissenting
opinion, 4 ' however, Chief Justice Burger endorsed the misappropriation theory because he felt that permitting Chiarella to profit on information belonging to his employer's clients gave Chiarella an unfair
advantage that he had not earned. 46 Consequently, Chief Justice
Burger felt that Chiarella should have been penalized because his conduct "serve[d] no useful function except his own enrichment at the
expense of others."'' 47 Justices Brennan and Stevens agreed with this
position in their concurring opinions' 4' and would have extended
insider trading liability to people who trade in violation of a duty
owed to someone other than purchasers or sellers of securities-generally, a duty owed either to employers or to clients of the
49
employers.'
Although the majority declined to address the misappropriation
theory, the favorable concurring opinions of Justices Stevens' 50 and
Brennan' and the dissenting opinion of Justice Burger 52 apparently
141. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235, 237.
142. Id. at 232.
143. Id. at 233.
144. Id. at 236. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, found that the jury was not
instructed on the elements of the tort of misappropriation, and that the jury instructions did
not suggest that Chiarella must be found to have had a confidential position. Id. at 237 n.21.
Therefore, the majority concluded that the misappropriation theory was not included in the

jury instructions. Id.
145. Chief Justice Burger found the misappropriation theory appropriate to lOb-5
violations, and that it had been properly presented to the jury. Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J.,

dissenting).
146. Id. at 240-41.
147. Id. at 241.
148. Id. at 238-39 (Brennan and Stevens, J.J., concurring).
149. Id. See Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I, 41 Bus.
LAW. 223, 235-37 (1985) [hereinafter Report of the Task Force on Insider Trading,Part1] (The

misappropriation theory extends insider trading liability to people who trade in violation of a
duty owed to someone other than purchasers or sellers of securities.).
150. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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encouraged the Second Circuit subsequently to adopt the misappropriation theory in United States v. Newman. 5 3 In Newman, two
investment bank employees tipped confidential information regarding
54
pending mergers and acquisitions to Newman, a securities trader.1
Newman traded on this information before it was made public and, in
addition, passed the information to two foreigners who also traded on
it. "55
' Following an SEC enforcement proceeding, the Department of
Justice brought criminal charges against Newman and the two investment bankers. 5 6 The Second Circuit found that because the investment bankers breached their fiduciary duties to their employers by
misappropriating information and tipping Newman, Newman's conduct was a criminal violation of Rule lOb-5."" The Second Circuit
found it irrelevant that the defendants had not purchased securities
from the investment banking firms or their corporate clients.'58
Rather, it was sufficient that the investment banking firms' reputations were at stake, and that the defendants' conduct inflated the
prices of the target companies' shares.'"
Under the same set of facts in a private civil action, however, the
Second Circuit did not find Newman liable for securities violations.6°
In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 6' the plaintiff sold stock in one of

the target companies on the same day that Newman purchased the
stock.1 62 The trial court dismissed the case, and the Second Circuit
affirmed. 63 The Second Circuit held that Newman, a registered broker/dealer, owed no duty either to abstain from trading or to disclose
the material nonpublic information to the general public.64 The Second Circuit also held that because none of the defendants-the same
defendants that were found guilty of securities fraud in Newmanhad a relationship with the plaintiff, who was merely a target company shareholder, the investment bankers' breach of duty to their
employers was not sufficient to provide civil liability.' 65 Thus, it
153. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

464 U.S. 863 (1983).
154. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 13.
157. Id. at 17.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984).
161. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id. at 13, 15-16.
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appears that under the same facts, liability under' the misappropriation theory depends upon whether the case is a civil or a criminal
action. 166
In Dirks v. SEC, 167 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and reinforced
the Chiarellalimitations on liability.168 In Dirks, a former director of
an insurance company informed Dirks, an investment analyst, that
the company fraudulently had overstated its assets on financial
reports. 69 Dirks investigated the situation and attempted to interest
the Wall Street Journal in publishing an expos6 of the fraud, but was
not immediately successful. 170 Dirks also informed clients and investors of his findings, 7" many of whom sold their holdings based on
172
that information.
The SEC brought enforcement proceedings against Dirks and
found that he had violated Rule lOb-5, as well as other provisions of
the securities laws, but penalized him only with a censure. 73 Dirks
appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the censure. 74 The Supreme Court reversed 75
and held that because Dirks had no relationship with the insurance
company, he could not have breached a fiduciary duty. 76 The Court
explicitly rejected the parity of access to information standard for liability and reaffirmed its position in Chiarella that the duty either to
disclose material nonpublic information or to abstain from trading
does not arise from the mere possession of material nonpublic information, but from the use of that information to violate a fiduciary
duty. 177 Furthermore, the Court held that for a tippee to be found to
78
have violated Rule lOb-5, the tipper must breach a fiduciary duty.
Thus, the tippee's duty-in this case, Dirk's duty either to disclose
material nonpublic information or to abstain from trading-depends
on whether the tipper-in this case, the former corporate directorsbreached a fiduciary duty by revealing the information.' 79 Because
166. The Moss court, however, did not explicitly discuss the basis for this difference. It
merely stated that none of the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty. Id. at 15.
167. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

168. Id. at 657 & n.16.
169. Id. at 648-49.
170. Id. at 649-50.
171. Id. at 649.

172. Id.
173. Id. at 650-52.
174. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829, 840, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

175. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
176. Id. at 665.
177. Id. at 657.
178. Id. at 660.

179. Id. at 661.
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the tipper-the former director of the insurance company-did not
use the information for personal benefit, he breached no fiduciary

duty. 180
In the most recent Supreme Court case to address the issue of

insider trading' United States v. Carpenter,'8 ' R. Foster Winans, a
reporter for the Wall Street Journal,disclosed the contents and timing
of his upcoming articles to two stockbroker friends.1 8 2 All three
traded on this information before the articles were published."8 3 Following an SEC investigation, in which Winans voluntarily confessed
to the scheme, 8 4 the Department of Justice brought criminal charges
against all three traders.'
All three were convicted of mail and wire
fraud, securities fraud, and conspiracy.18 6 On appeal, the Second Cir-

cuit reversed the conspiracy conviction but upheld the conviction on
the other counts. 8 7 Applying the misappropriation theory, the Second Circuit held that Winans was prohibited from using information
that belonged to his employer for personal gain.'
The court held
that the defendants' conduct violated the securities laws because, even
though none of the defendants had a relationship with any of the corporate subjects of the articles, the only breach was to the Wall Street
Journal and the only harm that the Journal suffered was to its
89
reputation.

The Supreme Court affirmed the defendants' convictions on both
the mail and wire fraud counts'

90

but split evenly over the 10b-5 vio-

180. Id. at 667.
181. 108 S.Ct. 316 (1987).
182. Id. at 319. Winans' disclosure violated the paper's policy of confidentiality. United
States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). An additional party to the Winans
trading venture was Peter Brant, the government's key witness. Id. at 829. Brant, who was a
top broker at Kidder, Peabody, was involved in the scheme from its inception and was,
according to Winans' testimony, its instigator. Id. at 832-33.
183. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 832-33. Winans' column often had "a perceptible effect on
the stock prices of the companies" that were the subject of the column. Pitt, The Limits of
Fraud: An Analysis of the Winans Case, 2 INSIGHTS 15 (1988). Thus, the traders advance
knowledge of the column's contents enabled them to take advantage of the anticipated market
reaction-which they did, to the tune of $700,000. Id. at 834.
184. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 837-38. This confession led to the entry of a consent decree,
inwhich Winans disgorged the small amount of profits he had made and was enjoined from
further violations. SEC v. Brant, No. 84 Civ. 3470 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1985).
185. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 829.
186. Id.
187. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 1031. The Second Circuit cited Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245, to hold that "Winans misappropriated-stole, to put it bluntlyvaluable nonpublic information entrusted to him inthe utmost confidence." Carpenter, 791
F.2d at 1031.
189. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032-33.
190. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
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lations.I9 The Court did not issue a written opinion on the securities
Thus, it is uncertain what, if any, precedent the case
law issues.
1 93
Because the Supreme Court's split has the effect of
will establish.
affirming the misappropriation theory under which Winans was found
misappropriation theory
guilty of securities fraud violations, the
1 94
appears to be a viable theory of liability.
In sum, the judicial construction of Rule lOb-5 has embraced
several theories. Originally, the gravamen of the violation concerned
a failure to fulfill a duty either to abstain from trading or to disclose
confidential information. 95 The definition of this duty and to whom

it is owed, however, has been the subject of much judicial debate. The
Cady Roberts theory of fiduciary duty 196 flowered into the broad possession theory of Texas Gulf Sulphur.197 The Supreme Court, how-

ever, rejected the broad possession theory in Chiarella. 9
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit's decision in Newman 199 undermined
the Chiarellalimitation by its application of the misappropriation theory. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks2 o established

an affirmative duty to speak for traditional corporate insiders and
extended that duty to include people who work for the corporation
within the purview of insiders.2"' Therefore, in a total silence case
such as Dirks, a person may be liable for trading on the basis of mate-

rial nonpublic information, even though there is no duty either to disclose the information or to abstain from trading.2" 2 Dirks renewed
191. Id
192. See id. at 320-22. This split had the procedural effect of affirming the securities fraud
conviction. Pitt, supra note 183, at 17.
193. Some commentators worry that the case will have an adverse effect on the SEC's
ability to prosecute civil insider trading cases and facilitate criminal prosecutions of insider
trading under the mail and wire fraud statutes. See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 183, at 18 (In the
absence of new legislation, the Winans decision leaves the SEC's ability to prosecute civil
insider trading cases under the misappropriation theory in jeopardy.).
194. Although Carpenterwas decided after the promulgation of ITSA and, therefore, is not
part of the judicial background of the statute, Congress left the definition of insider trading to
the courts. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983). Thus, Carpenteris important
to understanding the violation.
195. See, e.g., In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
196. Id. at 911.
197. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
198. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 235.
199. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16-17.
200. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-65.
201. Id. at 655 n.14.
202. The Dirks Court discussed this problem in footnote 14, in which it acknowledged that
in the case of corporate outsiders who become fiduciaries of the shareholders by virtue of their
employment by the corporation, a fiduciary duty could only be imposed when the relationship
between the corporation and the outsider was such as to imply a duty to keep the disclosed
nonpublic information confidential. Id. In those cases, there can be no duty to disclose. The
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and reinforced the rejection of the Texas GulfSulfur broad possession
theory but left questions unanswered regarding the misappropriation
theory.203 Furthermore, the Supreme Court may have undermined its
own stance of limited liability in Carpenter.2" Therefore, the evolving
case law that Congress expected to develop the definition of insider
trading is lacking in clear guidelines.
b.

Liability Under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 14e-3 Promulgated Thereunder

Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 14e-3 thereunder, extend
liability for antifraud violations to trading in connection with tender
offers.20 5 Rule 14e-3 contains a broad prohibition against tipping,
proscribing all communication of information relating to a tender
offer if it is reasonably foreseeable that the communication will result
in prohibited trading.2"6 The SEC issued Rule 14e-3 shortly after the
Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, perhaps as an attempt to
restore SEC enforcement powers that had been curbed by the
Court further acknowledged that "mere possession of nonpublic information does not give rise
to a duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific relationship does that." Id. at 656 n.15.
203. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-64.
204. See Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 321. Of course, because the Supreme Court discussed only
mail and wire fraud, but not securities fraud, Carpentermay not have answered or undermined
any analysis, and may be a mere sidelight in the on-going judicial discourse.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 14(e) provides that "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" in connection with tender offers are securities
violations. Id. Rule 14e-3 provides that once a substantial step has been taken toward the
commencement of a tender offer, or other extraordinary transaction, anyone with material
nonpublic information concerning the tender offer must wait "a reasonable time" after the
information is made public before trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986). Further, Rule 14e-3
imposes a duty on anyone with material nonpublic information about a tender offer either to
disclose or to abstain from trading, and not to cause others to trade in the securities subject to
the tender offer, but only if the person knows, or has reason to know, that the information was
obtained from the offeror, target, or insiders. Report of the Task Forceon Regulation of Insider
Trading, Part I, supra note 149, at 248. Also, Rule 14e-3 prohibits tipping of information
whether or not trading occurs and eliminates the need for the tipper or trader to have achieved
a personal benefit. Id. Finally, Rule 14e-3 predicates liability on the fact that the tipper
knows, or has reason to know, that the information came from insiders on the deal. Id.
An apparently anomalous result is that except under Rule 14e.3, which is limited to
tender offers-in which possession of material nonpublic information is enough to give rise to a
duty to abstain from trading, and except under the misappropriation theory, it appears as
though the insiders of one corporation may use material nonpublic information to trade in the
securities of another. Id. at 247. Multiservice financial institutions with an effective Chinese
Wall-an internal policy preventing information from an institution's investment banking or
research department from leaking into its trading department-are exempted from liability
under Rule 14e-3, as are sales to the tender offeror. Id. at 248-52.
206. Tipping occurs when any person in possession of material nonpublic information
communicates that information to a third person. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648
(1982).
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Chiarella decision. 20 There is, in practice, little distinction in the
applications of Section 14(e) and Rule lOb-5. 20 8 Both provisions are
so intertwined that decisions involving both provisions are often
unclear as to which provision is dispositive. 2°9
B. Legislative History: Conceptual Problems
ITSA's conceptual utilization of the antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act is not unproblematic. To begin with, Section 10(b) is
directed at fraud, not unfair trading, and is limited by its terms to
manipulative or deceptive devices. 2 10 This requires an element of
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.21 ' Thus, motivation
is the controlling factor for Section 10(b) liability. The controlling
factor in assessing ITSA liability, on the other hand, is "possession2 of
12
material nonpublic information" on which the accused has traded.
Therefore, possession and use, rather than motivation, are the controlling factors under ITSA.
In addition, the traditional understanding of fraud requires two
parties, one of whom reaps a pecuniary benefit through deceit at the
expense of the other.21 3 In the context of the impersonal marketplace,
unless there is a preexisting special relationship between the trading
parties, it is difficult to fit insider trading within the rubric of fraud.
The inside trader is not benefitting at the expense of those who sell or
buy on the market; presumably, they would have bought or sold anyway. 2 4 The "victims" of insider trading have no right to the information traded upon; thus, insider trading may well be a victimless
crime. 215 The duty either to abstain from trading or to disclose the
material nonpublic information traded upon is a duty that seeks to
207. Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 9, at 327. These authors argue

that "by promptly issuing Rule 14e-3, the SEC quickly restored a part of the [opportunity] set
[excised by Chiarella]. The SEC could not restore the set entirely. So, the restoration had to
proceed with circumspection." Id. The authors argue that the promulgation of ITSA was a
logical next step. Id. at 330.
208. See Lowenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule lob-5 Comparisons,71
GEo. L.J. 1311 (1983) (arguing that the judicial reliance on Rule lOb-5 precedents to set the

bounds of the Section 14(e) cause of action is unwarranted).
209. Id. at 1356.
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) makes it unlawful to employ "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." Id. See Pitt, supra note 183, at 18 (Rule
lOb-5 is directed at fraud, not unfair trading.).
211. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
213. Huss & Leete, Insider Trading Regulations: A Comparison of Judicial and Statutory
Sanctions, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 301, 309 (1987).
214. For a discussion of the question of who is actually harmed by insider trading, see R.
CLARK, supra note 5, at 265-75.
215. Pitt, supra note 183, at 16. As Pitt points out, Chiarella's discovery of prospective
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equalize bargaining positions, rather than insure against losses. 216
When an insider abstains from trading on the basis of nonpublic information, any loss suffered by public investors is a normal business risk
of the investment. 21 7 It would be difficult-if not impossible-to

demonstrate the degree to which insider trading, as opposed to other
factors, affects the market.218
Congress announced that it enacted ITSA in order to curb "trading in the securities markets ...

of 'material' information (generally,

information that would be important to an investor in making a decision to buy or sell a security) that is not available to the general public." ' 2 19 The stated purpose of the legislation was to proscribe trading

that undermined "the public's expectations of honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the same rules. ' 220 The
Supreme Court, however, has stated explicitly that "not every
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under
Section 10(b). ' '22 1 ITSA's legislative history, nonetheless, boldly proclaims that it intends to curb the "abuse of informational advantages
that other investors cannot hope to overcome through their own
efforts. ' 222 ITSA, therefore, appears to apply the parity of access to
information standard that was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Dirks.223 These statements also indicate that Congress contemplated
a much broader theory of liability than applied by the Supreme Court
in Chiarella,in which the Court limited liability to persons who have
224
a fiduciary relationship to the shareholders.
The House Report made no mention of Chiarella and only discussed Dirks in order to limit the case to its "unique facts. ' 2 25
Rather, Congress relied on Cady Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur for

the proposition that "trading by corporate officials and employees on
takeover target identities without inducing sellers to part with stock, and without any
entitlement of the victims to the information, is a victimless crime. Id.
216. R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 101.
217. See Note, supra note 28, at 100.
218. Id. at 109.
219. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983). The Supreme Court has recently
defined "material" as it pertains to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, by adopting the standard
promulgated by TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in the proxysolicitation context. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). The definition finds facts
material if "there is a substantial likelihood a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important ... [or if a reasonable investor would think it] significantly altered the total mix of
information available." Id. at 983.
220. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983).
221. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661 n.21.
222. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
223. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646.
224. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232-35.
225. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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information gained in their employment violates fiduciary duties and
violates the federal securities laws."'2 26 In doing so, Congress circumvented the Supreme Court's express ruling in Chiarellathat the fiduciary duty must extend to the shareholders of the corporation whose
securities were traded.227
Furthermore, Congress extended the definition of insider trading
in the legislative history-while expressly denying that it was defining
the term-by emphasizing that it expected the SEC to pursue violations by "outsiders," such as underwriters, investment analysts, lawyers, accountants, financial printers, government officials, and others
who, by virtue of access to nonpublic information, become "constructive insiders. '228 Congress stated that "for the purposes of the antifraud provisions, it does not matter whether the information about a
corporation or its securities originates from inside or outside the corporation. ' 229 Congress also explicitly endorsed the misappropriation
theory in the House Report, stating that because conversion of information is punished in other areas of the law, an equally rigorous code
of conduct should be enforced under the securities laws.23°
Congress further expanded liability under ITSA by failing to
define the ill that ITSA was promulgated to remedy.231 Congress
explicitly declined to define insider trading in ITSA, due, at least in
part, to a fear that "the adoption of a statutory definition could
reduce flexibility. ' 232 To support its assertion that a statutory definition was not necessary because "the law with respect to insider trading [was] sufficiently well-developed at [the] time to provide adequate
guidance," Congress endorsed only three lower court cases: Texas
Gulf Sulphur,233 SEC v. Lund,234 and United States v. Newman.235
Congress also cited Rule 14e-3 236 in support of this proposition.237
226. Id. at 14-15 (1983).
227. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
228. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983).
229. Id. at 4.
230. Id,at 5.
231. Although Senator D'Amato of New York originally sought a definition of insider
trading, he dropped his search in the interest of expeditiously passing the bill. The Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearingon H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
232. Id.
233. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
234. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
235. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 & n.20
(1983).
236. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986).
237. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983).
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As discussed previously, 3 1 Texas Gulf Sulphur and Newman
utilize broad theories of insider trading liability. In Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the Second Circuit asserted the parity of access to information standard, concluding that liability for trading on nonpublic information was proper, even without a fiduciary relationship.2 39 In
Newman, the Second Circuit's theory of liability was that converting
confidential information for personal gain is a fraud on the source of
the confidential information. 240 This misappropriation theory has
now become the SEC's primary vehicle for reaching nontraditional
insider trading cases.241
Moreover, Congress, by citing Lund in the House Report, further extended liability for insider trading to include the mere implication of a confidential relationship.242 In Lund, the president of a
venture capital firm called Lund, his long-term friend and business
associate, to see if Lund's company would be interested in investing in
a corporate joint venture.243 Although Lund's company declined the
opportunity, Lund personally bought securities based on this nonpublic information. 2 " The district court recognized that Horowitz, the
venture capital firm president, did not breach a fiduciary duty to his
company or its shareholders by divulging the information to Lund
because Horowitz had a legitimate business reason for discussing the
joint venture plans with Lund.24 The district court also found that,
absent a breach of fiduciary duty by Horowitz, Lund could not be
liable under Section 10(b) as a tippee. 2 " The district court, instead,
assessed liability against Lund for insider trading based on a theory of
temporary insider trading status derived from the friendly relationship between the two men. 247 This relationship, the district court held,
gave Lund temporary insider status and created an implication of
confidentiality.248
Liability for insider trading based on the mere implication of
confidentiality derived from a personal friendship is a much different
standard of liability than the one announced by the Supreme Court in
Dirks, in which the Court required the existence of a fiduciary rela238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
.248.

See supra notes 129-30 & 153-66 and accompanying text.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
Langevoort, supra note 83, at 111.
See SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
Id. at 1402-03.
Id. at 1400-01.
Id. at 1402.
Id.
Id. at 1403.
Id.
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tionship, with a legitimate expectation of confidentiality, for liability
to attach.249 Under the Dirks theory, a necessary precondition for
insider trading liability is the breach of a fiduciary duty by a corporate
insider.250 In Lund, however, Horowitz breached no duty. Rather,
the district court found Lund to be a "temporary insider" by virtue of
his friendship with Horowitz.251
Thus, although explicitly declining to provide a statutory definition of the offense, ITSA, in fact, has significantly altered the definition of insider trading.252 This expanded concept of liability results in
a definition of insider trading that now encompasses a very broad
range of activity on the part of a wide variety of stock exchange players.2 3 The legislative history of ITSA supports a view that the personal use of any material nonpublic informational advantage is
249. 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. In Dirks, the Court found that because the corporate insiders
breached no duty to the corporation in exposing a fraud, the trading tipper-analyst had no
derivative duty to disclose or abstain. Id. at 657-58.
250. For an illuminating discussion of the implications of the citation to Lund rather than
to Dirks or Chiarella in the legislative history of ITSA, see Langevoort, supra note 83, at 105.
According to Professor Langevoort, the drafters actively considered addressing prevailing law,
but decided not to do so. Id. at 90. Instead, they "strongly expressed an intention that the
legal doctrine of insider trading restrictions be inventive and result oriented-flexible enough
to reach a wide range of abuses." Id. at 90-91. The broad Lund theory of liability also ignores
the earlier Chiarellalimitation, in which, for tippers and tippees, the breach of a fiduciary duty
by a corporate insider, either a traditional insider or an insider by virtue of a fiduciary
relationship to the corporation, is a necessary precondition to tippee liability. Id. at 107.
251. Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1403.
252. See Langevoort, supra note 83, at 90-91 (ITSA, although purporting to endorse
judicial construction of insider trading rules, actually expanded insider trading liability.).
253. The legislative history of ITSA indicates the congressional concern with the
widespread public disregard for insider trading prohibitions. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983). The pervasiveness of insider trading activity despite its illegality is apparent
from the numerous cases in which the traders were not members of the traditional professional
investment community. These traders were not necessarily financially sophisticated, and the
sums they gained or lost from trading were often quite modest. For example, in SEC v.
Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the district court granted a preliminary
injunction against two policemen who violated the securities laws when they traded on inside
information obtained from a source with whom they had no direct contact. Id. at 1062. The
policemen testified that they thought the information could have been inside information, and
did not investigate further because they did not want to know. Id. A plausible inference from
that statement is that although they recognized that insider trading was illegal, trading on the
basis of knowledge not known to the general public was not itself "wrong," as long as they did
not know that the information was "misappropriated." Id. The court found that the
policemen, nevertheless, were liable and that conscious avoidance of knowledge is not sufficient
to defeat scienter. Id. at 1063. One commentator remarked that there will probably not be
much testimony like that in the future. 20 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 148 (1988) (remarks
attributed to Harvey Pitt). The point is not that it was a particularly forceful argument;
rather, the point is that the concept of unfair advantage does not appear to have been part of
the policemen's logic. Of course, it may also be that Chairman Ruder is correct, and they
simply did not think they would be caught. See infra note 259.
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actionable.2 54 Moreover, "under both rules lOb-5 and 14e-3, a person
may commit a violation without appreciating the illegality of his
actions." 255 This burgeoning liability, with no clear notice of what
conduct may be criminal, creates restrictive impediments to lawful
business activity, business uncertainty, and a lack of liquidity, due to a
fear of being inadvertently trapped in an insider trading violation. 25 6
Consequently, a clear definition of insider trading is essential. 257
This broad expansion of liability results in a vision of widespread,
nearly universal, conduct that is becoming uncontrollable. 258 If SEC
Chairman David Ruder is correct-that insider trading is a prevalent
and pervasive practice that most Americans see as innocuous 259 -the
254. See 130 CONG. REC. H7757 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).

255. Langevoort, supra note 83, at 95 n.26.
256. Id. at 98-102 (discussing secondary liability).
257. This concern is underscored by the recent unanimous passage by Congress of new
insider trading legislation. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (to be codified at scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). This legislation contained no definition of insider trading, despite the fact that an
insider trading definition bill has been before Congress for over a year. S. 1380, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987). The bill would "clarify the application of the proposed insider trading
prohibitions to market information, the scope of derivative liability, and the application of the
proposal to communications to and from investment analysts." Securities Law Daily (BNA)
(February 19, 1988). Despite a congressional disclaimer that it was not attempting to create a
"parity of information standard that would prohibit persons from gaining informational
advantages through legitimate activities," the legislative language in a draft the SEC proposed
is very broad. Id. Nevertheless, no definition was included in the most recent law. Pub. L.
No. 100-704 (1988).
258. For example:
[SEC Chairman David] Ruder commented that he was struck by the fact that the
ordinary, average American citizen has not recognized the need to refrain from
insider trading, despite that fact that it is a crime and a securities violation. He
cited family connection cases where one member of a family readily passed on
illegal information to other relatives who traded and illegally profited from the
information. . . . [Furthermore, Ruder added] there is, and always will be,
substantial amounts of insider trading.
19 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 1923 (Dec. 18, 1987) [hereinafter Remarks of Ruder]. The
case law is full of instances of insiders and "constructive insiders" passing on "misappropriated" information to their friends and loved ones. See, e.g., SEC v. Thayer, No. 84 Civ. 0066
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (The Dirks personal gain test was expanded to include friendship and sexual
favors.). Congress placed the blame squarely on a public that feels it can get away with such
activities. Id. It is possible that the explanation for the widespread disregard for insider trading prohibitions rests on the public perception that there is nothing wrong with using an informational advantage. Because it is difficult to articulate what is intrinsically unfair about using
an informational advantage in a capitalist financial system in which informational and other
advantages are consistently rewarded with a bigger slice of the pie, penalizing the use of such
advantages in the context of trading resonates as hypocritical.
259. See Remarks of Ruder, supra note 258. Certainly the legal press appears to agree with
Ruder. See, e.g., Report of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on
Criminal Law, supra note 5, at 2 (Claiming a "widespread belief that 'everyone is doing it'--or
at least that everyone who has the opportunity to do it is doing it.").
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extension of the right to jury trial2 6 to insider trading cases may have
a significant effect. 261 The legal mechanisms of argument and crossexamination may promote a clarification of the intellectual issues
involved in securities2 62
regulation by way of a repeated consideration of
multiple viewpoints.
IV.

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROBLEMS IN
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION

Cognitive dissonance is the human phenomenon of psychological
stress that occurs whenever theory and observed reality become irreconcilable.263 The amount of cognitive dissonance a person or group
experiences after making a decision is directly proportional to the
observed results that are perceived inconsistent with the basis for
making that decision. 26" The greater the conflict a group experiences
before making a particular decision, the greater the subsequent dissonance is likely to be, and the greater the tendency to justify the decision by increasing the perceived attractiveness of the chosen
alternative and decreasing the perceived merits of the rejected alternative. 265 The regulation of insider trading is a paradigm of this behav260. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Tull, a jury trial was not available when the
SEC sought an injunction from the court, even if it also sought monetary disgorgement. See,
e.g., Jacobs, ProceduralMattersin Actions Brought Under Rule lob-5, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV.361,
402 (1981).
261. Even though there is no right to a jury trial in an administrative proceeding before the
SEC, Jacobs, supra note 260, at 402, and only a small fraction of SEC actions are litigated, see
Kronstein, SEC Practice,11 SEC. REG. L.J. 284 (1983), the possible addition of the jury's voice
will affect the parties' bargaining positions. This is the phenomenon noted by Green as the
"mythical jury." Green, supra note 20, at 158. According to Green, all negotiations are tested
against the presumed reactions of "the spectral jury in the background which would have
materialized had the case been tried." Id.
262. For a discussion of cognitive processes and their application to legal decisionmaking,
see Edwards & Von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implicationsfor the Law, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 225, 270 (1986) (The most fundamental operational principle of decision
analysis is that the iteration of repeated consideration of an issue, from multiple viewpoints,
leads to wisdom.). For a discussion of the poor foundation on which regulation of insider
trading is based, see generally Wolfson, A Critiqueof the Securitiesand Exchange Commission,
30 EMORY L.J. 119 (1981). By all accounts, insider trading continues to flourish despite
heightened prosecution. See, e.g., Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property
Rights, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 79 (1987). Nonetheless, the SEC proclaims its enforcement efforts a
success. See Goeltzer, Symposium on Insider Trading-Introduction,13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,
7 n.16 (1984).
263. See generally Edwards & Von Winterfeldt, supra note 262; Scott, Errorand Rationality
in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and
the Management of Choices, 59 S.CAL. L. REV.329 (1986); Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
264. L. FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION AND DISSONANCE 5 (1964).

265. The conflict between what a person experiences as reality and the justifications for his
choice of action results in the psychic distress of cognitive dissonance, a distress that the
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ior pattern. The SEC's preoccupation with insider trading strikes an
increasingly dissonant note as the distance between regulation theory
and the reality of the marketplace grows increasingly irreconcilable.2 66 Although the SEC readily admits-as it must in the face of
overwhelming evidence-that insider trading is a prevalent practice
that pervades all levels of society, 267 it declares that its enforcement
efforts are a success. 268 Congress assumed that increased penalties
would deter insider trading.269 As the current SEC Chairman readily
admits, however, insider trading is not only widespread, it is unstoppable. 270 Furthermore, there are significant questions as to whether it
makes economic sense to stop the practice, even if it were possible to
27
do so.

1

Since the 1930's, the American system of securities regulation
has been based on a set of assumptions, assumptions that recent
advances in information technology have rendered invalid.2 72 The
advent of the computer age makes the instantaneous reflection of
information in stock prices a reality.273 Modern technology alters the
market structure and makes the market more efficient by minimizing
person will attempt to assuage by polarizing the attractiveness of the alternatives. Id. at 6.
This distortion is increased when a particular group within society has an interest in
maintaining the alternative because the group's power and prestige are at stake. Sunstein,
supra note 263, at 1139.
266. This increasing disparity between theory and reality is a key indicator of cognitive
dissonance. L. FESTINGER, supra note 264, at 5-6.
267. Some disagree with the notion that insider trading is legitimate compensation for
corporate contributions Pitt, supra note 98, at 21. Others, including this author, would align
themselves with state law principles in which only the corporate owner of the information has
a cause of action against the insider trader. See Remarks of Ruder, supra note 258.
268. Kripke's remark that the only way to understand the SEC "mind-set" is to view it as a
theology supports this personal observation, at least in part. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 2, at
4; see also Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act, in H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 27 (1983) (SEC sees
itself as charged with protecting "investor confidence in the fairness and integrity [ofl
the best
securities markets the world has ever known."). Moreover, "[t]he SEC's feelings of its own
importance lend a deadly seriousness to its efforts at enlarging the scope of the statutes it
administers." H. KRIPKE, supra note 2, at 37.
269. 130 CONG. REC. H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
270. See supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
271. For a discussion and assessment of the judicial debate over the use of "macroeconomic
free market perspective," see The Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading,
Part I, supra note 149, at 224-26.
272. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 748. Professor Langevoort suggests that new technology
has radically altered the structure and function of the securities markets and proposes that this
factor mandates a reexamination of securities regulation. Id. at 749.
273. The price of securities that are widely traded-those with highly liquid and efficient
markets-reflect all available information almost instantaneously. Langevoort, supra note 84,
at 96. See Patell & Wolfson, The IntradaySpeed ofAdjustment of Stock Prices to Earningsand
Dividend Announcements, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1984) (The reflection of information in stock
prices occurs within hours, if not minutes.).
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transaction costs and facilitating the flow of information. 274 Efficient
markets permit the individual investor to forego independent research
regarding risks and returns of particular securities because the price
approximates the public consensus of the security's value.275 Modern
technology also offers investors access to the instantaneous collection
and dissemination of investment information in other ways, such as

on-line market data.2 76 This improved access to information makes

the opportunity to identify undervalued stock-to the extent such
opportunity exists at all-a minimal one. 277 Thus, it is no longer valid
to assume that public access to information in the form of official disclosure is necessary to make the markets fair and assure investor confidence. 2 7' The theory that market fairness requires equal access to
information-a parity of information standard enunciated by Congress in ITSA's legislative history279-ignores the modern fact that

there is near instantaneous assimilation of all information in the price
of securities.28 0 With the advent of modern technology, insider trad-

ing impacts the market significantly faster than any form of official
public disclosure. 281 Because a security's price reflects the consensus
of investor evaluations of all available information almost instantane274. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 751, 755.
275. Id. at 751.
276. Id. at 757.
277. Id. at 759.
278. This assumption is quite clearly the basis for the promulgation of ITSA and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, as it was for the securities acts of 1933
and 1934. See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (Capital formation and
our nation's economic growth depend on investor confidence in the fairness of our markets.).
The theory of market fairness, or parity of access to information, to the extent that it is valid at
all in the computer age, departs from the underlying assumption of a competitive economy,
which is that those who have acquired a superior market position should be rewarded.
Friedman, Efficient Market Theory and Rule lob-5 Nondisclosure Claims: A Proposalfor
Reconciliation, 47 Mo. L. REV. 745, 753 (1982). Arguably, insider trading is legitimate
compensation for corporate contributions and, thus, should be within the discretion of the
corporation. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 93, at 108-09 (arguing for a property theory of
insider trading liability in which only the corporate owner of the information has a right of
action).
The Supreme Court gave the property theory of insider trading an unexpected boost in
Carpenter v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 316, 320 (1987). In Carpenter,the Court predicated the
defendants' liability on the theory that the Wall Street Journalowned the property rights to
any ideas that Winans developed for publication in his article. Id. The Court held that anyone
acquiring "special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary
relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge for his own personal benefit, but
must account to his principal for any profits derived therefrom. Id. One commentator has
noted that the Court's language suggests that the Journal might have its own cause of action
against Winans. Pitt, supra note 183, at 18.
279. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1983).
280. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 759.
281. Id.
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ously, market price is, in itself, a fair indication of a stock's fair
value.2 82 Other safeguards, therefore, are unnecessary and may
impede the efficiency of the market.
Congress attributed the growth of the insider trading problem to
market developments, such as the increased trade in stock options and
"the explosion in the size and volume of tender offers. ' 2 3 In fact, the
explicit rationale that Congress gave for the legislation was that
"abuse of informational advantages that other investors cannot hope

to overcome through their own efforts is unfair and inconsistent with
the investing public's legitimate expectation of honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the same rules. ' 28 4 When
describing the effects of insider trading on the market, however, Congress did not refer to the investing public's losses. Rather, the House

Report cited the losses of market makers and specialists.28 5
A.

The Economic Validity of the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984

In neither the 1934 Act nor ITSA is the economic theory of efficient markets utilized either in conception or in application.28 6 The
282. Id. See Cohen, The SuitabilityRule andEconomic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1607-11
(1971) (Because the marketplace is efficient, stock is fairly valued, and the investment decision
should depend only on the risk preferences of the individual investor.); Fischel, Use of Modern
Finance Theory in SecuritiesFraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1,
3-5 (1982) (Equalizing investor access to information is unnecessary in light of capital market
efficiency.). The Supreme Court's decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988),
appears to endorse the efficient market hypothesis. In Basic, rather than requiring each
investor claiming damages for securities fraud under Rule lob-5 to prove reliance on corporate
statements, the Court applied a presumption of reliance based on a fraud-on-the-market
theory. Id. at 988-93. This theory contemplates investor reliance on the price set by an
impersonal market as reflecting all available information. Id. at 988-89. The Court expressly
based its presumption of reliance on the fact that "[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the
price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price." Id. at 991-92.
Whatever theory one espouses, it is clear that the regulatory scheme should facilitate
information reaching the market, rather than requiring people to forego trading opportunities.
See Letter of Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 98, at 21.
283. Pitt, Ain & Snyder, Liabilityfor Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws,
PRAc. L. INST., SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 190 (1987).
284. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983). For a discussion of the problems
that the adoption of the fairness approach causes, see Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An
InitialInquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798,
816-17.
285. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1983). The emphasis is troubling precisely
because the market makers and specialists do not represent the public, but are a discrete
interest group. For an explanation of the role of market makers and specialists, see generally
Haddock & Macey, supra note 9.
286. The Senate Report, in fact, dismissed the efficient market theory as "rubbish" without
further discussion. 130 CONG. REC. H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (appending editorial
Longstreth, Halting Insider Trading, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at A27, col. 1-3). One
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efficient market hypothesis assumes that stock prices reflect all available relevant information and leave no opportunity to make economic
profits.28 7 This theory implies that an investment strategy that
attempts to outguess the market must be suspect. Moreover, the efficient market hypothesis posits that price captures information about,
and predicts the future payout of, a security. 288 Despite transaction
costs and unequal access to, or differing assessments of, information,
prevailing prices fully reflect all available information.2 8 9 This is not
to say, however, that there will not be occasional windfalls or losses.
Rather, the efficient market model incorporates the idea of luck. 2"
Finally, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that regulating
insider trading may be a theoretical misconception. Insider trading,
far from being a detriment to the functioning of securities markets,
may provide a valuable benefit by moving market prices in the proper
direction. 29 ' To the extent that the market undervalues securities, it is
explanation for this neglect may be an inability of the regulators or legislators to assess the
validity of the theory. As one commentator remarked: "Economic theory has never been the
long suit of either the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the courts in the
administration and interpretation of the federal securities laws. Nor has concern about
theoretical consistency in achieving pragmatic results under the various securities statutes."
Friedman, Efficient Market Theory, supra note 9, at 299. It would seem logical, however, to
require regulators to develop such an understanding before commencing interference with the
economics of market function.
287. Voluminous empirical evidence supports the efficient market hypothesis and its special
case corollary the random walk hypothesis. See, e.g., Schwert, Using Financial Data to
Measure Effects of Regulation, J. LAW & ECON. 121, 125 (1985). These theories assume stock
prices reflect all available relevant information, leaving no opportunity to make economic
profits because returns are constant over time for each asset, although expected returns can
differ among assets. Id. at 124-25. Thus, while market investors will occasionally make
profits, the profits will be strictly random and will be offset by the same or other investors'
market losses. Id.
288. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 770. These authors question the applicability
of the efficient market hypothesis in a complex world in which accurate testing may be
impossible. Id. at 761. This premise is questionable, however, for two reasons. First, the
authors discredited the random walk hypothesis based on a single study in which analysts'
forecasts were able to achieve superior risk adjusted returns of 1.7%. Id. at 845-46. This
conclusion seems premature based on a single study of 35 stockbrokers and one institutional
investor in the United Kingdom. Id. at 845 n.242. Second, they suggest that because the
market reacts slowly to analysts' forecasts, the assimilation of information may not be
instantaneous. Id. at 846. This conclusion does not take into account the primary assumption
of the efficient market theory-that the market would have assimilated the information that
the analysts uncovered well before they could publicly announce it.
289. Id. at 771.
290. Friedman, supra note 9, at 758. Because luck is the most democratic of phenomena,
benefitting people without regard to wealth, social status or inherent merit, it is intrinsically
fair. Id.
291. Insider trading provides
[B]enefits to the marketplace, by providing an indirect means of information
regarding corporate developments; to investors, by moving the prevailing market
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because there is relevant information that is unknown to the
marketplace.2 92
Under the current regulations, corporations routinely are permitted to withhold information from the market, as long as withholding
this information does not render any of the information that the corporation does release misleading, and as long as corporate insiders do
not trade on this information. 293 Thus, the market-if these regulations are obeyed-does not receive all of the information necessary to
operate efficiently.294 To the extent that this withheld information is
leaked to the market in the form of insider trading, the market price is
pushed in the proper direction.2 95 If the insider trading prohibitions
were actually successful-which by all accounts they are not 296 -- the
market would be deprived of this important equalizing force.297 In
other words, "the partial information that it receives from the market
activity of the insiders [is] activity that at least moves the market
in
298
the direction that it will take when full disclosure is made.
prices in the proper direction; to corporate managers, by providing them with a
means of extraordinary compensation for their developmental efforts on behalf of
the enterprise; and to the corporation, by providing corporate shareholders and
managers with [these] benefits.
Morgan, supra note 93, at 82.
292. Id. at 105.
293. See id. at 106. For example, corporate officer insider reports, filed with the SEC on
Forms 3 and 4, are frequently filed late. Pitt, Inside Information, BARRON'S 50, 53 (Aug. 18,
1988). In attempting to address this problem, one securities expert has called for immediate
announcement of any purchase of more than 5% of a company's stock, followed by filing
within two days. Id. (proposal attributed to former SEC Commissioner Roberta Carmel).
Another expert finds this plan unworkable because there will be "a lot of things lost in
transmission if you're relying on the announcement process." Id. (remarks of Harvey L. Pitt).
Rather, he suggests requiring that such information be filed within two days. Id.
294. Morgan, supra note 93, at 106.
295. "[U]nlike misrepresentations or misleading statements (which move the market in the
direction opposite to the true information), trading on undisclosed, accurate information
moves the market in the proper direction." Id. at 107.
296. See Remarks of Ruder, supra note 7.
297. Of course, this assertion depends to some extent on what Friedman calls "the
observer's theology." Friedman, supra note 9, at 753. Friedman points out that:
One school believes that it is impossible for a corporation to keep the market
constantly informed about significant changes in corporate affairs, so efficient
markets are furthered by insider trading which operates to channel additional
information to the market less directly. Apostates [of securities regulation],
however, suggest that full information dissemination is possible and that insider
trading merely impedes dissemination by creating incentives for delay or
nondisclosure.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Although Professor Friedman acknowledges that "[e]mpirical evidence is inconclusive as to the possibility of full information dissemination," id., the stronger
position appears to be that insider trading furthers efficient markets by driving prices in the
correct direction. See, e.g., R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 280.
298. Friedman, supra note 9, at 753.
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B.

Changes in the Market Structure

Not only have these economic theories clarified the way markets
function, there also have been major and unanticipated changes in the
market environment since the enactment of the 1934 Act. In the
1930's, private investors effected most transactions; today, however,
most investors are institutional.299 Presently, only 10% of the New
York Stock Exchange volume is based on individual investor transactions.3oc Institutions, on the other hand, account for over 50%, and
brokerage firms account for 30%.301 Although some commentators
bemoan this fact and ascribe it to the public's perception that the market is rigged,30 2 it is unlikely that individuals will regain their former
prominence in the market. Simply stated, institutional investors are
likely to continue to predominate3 0 3 because they currently are more
efficient than individuals. 3° Thus, it may be erroneous to base an
entire regulatory scheme on a structural foundation that is only questionably valid. If the individual investor is no longer the predominant
force in the market, maintaining his confidence in market fairness
may no longer be a priority. 30 5 Moreover, even if investor confidence
were a major concern, burgeoning insider trading activity does not
seem to have affected investor confidence.30 6 Rather, investors continue to participate in the securities market despite the well-publicized
prevalence of insider trading. 0 7
If insider trading is not an evil from which public investors need
protection, then heavy regulation in this area creates considerable
cognitive dissonance. 08 Congress' explanation that legislation should
299. Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, PartI, supra note 149, at
226.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See,e.g.,
Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on
Criminal Law, supra note 5, at 16 (1984) (asserting that the substantial decrease in individual
trading on the stock exchanges is probably due to the public perception that the stock market
is an insider's game).
303. But see Langevoort, supra note 9, at 760 (asserting that the large savings in
transactions costs that institutional investors currently enjoy, and that give them their market
preeminence, may be decreased by automation).
304. See, e.g.,
id.at 759.
305. In a market in which the individual investor accounts for only 10% of the trading, any
assertion that the confidence of the individual investor makes a real difference is questionable.
306. The number of individual investors has actually risen from approximately 30.8 million
in 1970 to 42.4 million in 1983. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 509 (106th
ed. 1986).
307. Morgan, supra note 93, at 82.
308. "[I]t is not at all clear that insider trading is an evil from which investors need to be
protected. If insider trading is in fact beneficial (or at least not harmful) to investors, then...
they need no protection." Morgan, supra note 93, at 102 (emphasis in original). For a view
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be enacted to protect "market makers and specialists" was that those
actors are "necessary to the liquidity of the market. ' ' 30 9 No further

explanation or justification was offered. In fact, there is evidence that
insider trading regulation does not, and is not intended to, protect
public investors; rather, the evidence shows that insider trading regulation benefits a specific interest group--the market professionals. a 0
These are competing and contradictory messages that create an
increasing cognitive dissonance both within the SEC and the society
that tries to implement these rules.
C.

The Regulation Theory and the Reality of the Marketplace

Neither of the two current models of regulatory action theory
accounts for insider trading regulation. According to the public
choice model, 31 regulatory actions should divert wealth from rela-

tively diffuse groups to strong interest groups.312 If Congress, however, drew the lines correctly between public investors and insiderscorporate officers, directors, other key employees, and large stockholders-then the SEC is diverting wealth from a group with cohesion, the insiders, to a diffuse group, the public investors. Thus, the
regulations do not appear to fit within this model.3a 3
The public interest model of regulation theory, on the other
hand, relies on efficiency theory and explains that market regulation is
motivated by a search for greater efficiency in the economy. 3 4 Thus,
insider trading regulation, under this theory, is explained as a way of
increasing economic efficiency and is justified by gains that exceed the
costs of regulation. Because there is strong evidence that insider trading regulation is economically inefficient-evidence that indicates that
shareholders would actually benefit if insiders were permitted to trade
on the basis of information not yet reflected in the securities'
price 3 '-this model is also inadequate to describe the intense political
that "the enforcement work of the Commission, at best, reflects an over-zealous insensitivity to
individual liberties and the values of a free society; and at worst, a deliberate pattern of serious
and inexcusable violations of fundamental rights and elementary notions of fairness," see
Freedman & Sporkin, supra note 9, at 78 1.
309. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
310. See, e.g., Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 9.
311. For a cogent explanation of public choice theory, see id. at 312.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Shareholders would benefit from insiders' trades because these trades would move the
stock price in the proper, more accurate, direction. See supra notes 286-98 and accompanying
text. Of course, this point is highly controversial, and many commentators would disagree.
See Pitt, supra note 98, at 23. For example, one expert in the area of securities law feels that
the true gravamen of insider trading is stealing, and that even if the thief may make more
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demand for increased penalties reflected in ITSA.
The problem can be resolved and understood by redrawing the
lines in the public choice model.3 16 Congress drew the line between
public investors and insiders. If the line is redrawn between insiders
and market professionals, each interest group will have incentives to
compete for favor with the SEC, and each will be more cohesive than
the investing public. The market professionals, however, are more

cohesive than insiders, and have more of an incentive to seek prohibitions on uses of inside information. 3 7 Although market professionals

are a more cohesive group, however, they systematically lose "to
those with better information who include insiders trading on inside
information and arbitrageurs trading on the basis of tips. 31 8 Thus,
abolishing the right of insiders to trade on inside information removes
a competitor for market profits and, at the same time, leaves intact the
market professionals' informational advantage-based on superior
research skills-over the general public.3 19

Furthermore, this modified public choice theory demonstrates
that the regulatory agency, the SEC, has a strong incentive to barrage

the most disfavored of the three groups involved, the public, 320 with
misinformation in order to prevent it from discovering where its true
efficient use of the information than the general market place, the conduct should be prohibited

even if that conduct does not harm anyone. Id. at 24. The others, including this author,
disagree, and propose granting the entitlement to prosecuting insider trading to those it may
harm-the corporations.. See Friedman, supra note 278, at 760-61 (proposing that the
entitlement to prosecution of insider traders should be with the corporations rather than with a
regulatory agency); Morgan, supra note 93, at 103-09 (arguing property rights analysis will

help distinguish helpful from harmful insider trading).
316. For an in-depth explication of this theory, see generally Haddock & Macey,
Regulation on Demand, supra note 9.
317. Market professionals systematically profit from trades with less informed outsiders.
Id. at 331.
318. Id. at 332.
319. Id. at 331. According to Haddock and Macey, "[i]t
is no accident that enforcement of
bans on insider trading moved to the top of the SEC agenda in 1980, the year of the Chiarella
decision." Id. at 332. The reason the authors give for this phenomenon is that before
Chiarella, the broad Texas Gulf Sulphur theory of liability, see supra notes 129-31 and
accompanying text, disadvantaged the two groups equally, making the SEC's enforcement
efforts too expensive to pursue. Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 9, at
332-33. After Chiarella, however, the market professionals were "liberated" from the ban
because, generally, they did not have a fiduciary duty. Id. at 333. Thus, the scale of marginal
value of political support for regulations tipped in favor of the market professionals, who then
made their services available to the enforcement efforts of the SEC. Id. at 333. This theory
would suggest that the number of insider trading cases brought against market professionals
should approach zero. When some market professionals are penalized, this is the result of
both interest groups benefitting from the market professional being sanctioned for trading on
information gained through a confidential relationship with an enterprise. Id.
320. The public is the most disfavored of the three groups because it has the least cohesion
and the least access to informational advantage. Id. at 333.
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interests lie. 32' An example of this propaganda is the assertion that
321. Id. at 323-24. This may appear to be an unjustifiably harsh statement. According to
cognitive theory, however, people find it increasingly important to justify a chosen course of
action when there is conflict between the ostensible reasons for the choice and the experienced
reality. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text. An example of this mechanism is the
propaganda that accompanies the perpetuation of gender roles through legal rules. See
Sunstein, supra note 263, at 1139. Even women adversely affected by those rules may accept
the propaganda as true and convince themselves that they are satisfied with a tyrannical status
quo, in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. Id.
A similar mechanism is evident in the insider trading regulation situation. See Haddock
& Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 9, at 317-18. The primary justification that
regulatory proponents cite for insider trading is fair play in the marketplace. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983). The rhetoric of fair play has enormous political
appeal and was a major factor motivating the promulgation of ITSA, as well as the 1934 Act.
See Langevoort supra note 83, at 91. While the rhetoric of fairness of the markets was similar
in the two acts, the emphasis was not. In the 1934 Act, Congress was concerned with the
perceived abuses of traditional insiders:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the
subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and
officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential
information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market
activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment
of inside information by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers,
exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to enable them
to acquire and profit by information not available to others.
Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Criminal Law,
supra note 5, at 5 (1984) (quoting SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK
EXCHANGE PRACTICE, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934)).

The current emphasis is on an entirely different set of traders, those who are not fiduciaries to corporations trading on the exchanges, but who have been able to obtain information
that is not generally known, and to profit by it. See supra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
But none of these developments were discussed by the legislators in the promulgation of ITSA.
Rather, Congress, capitulated to the SEC's agenda of making insider trading an enforcement
priority without examining the validity of such a priority. ITSA's legislative history demonstrates this kind of general support for the current increase in SEC enforcement actions:
The current Commission has made the prosecution of insider trading a priority,
and has brought more such cases during the past four years than in all previous
years combined. Although the Commissions's visible enforcement program
against insider trading has raised the level of awareness of the public, there
remains a public perception that the risk of detection is slight.
H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See Janvey, SEC Investigation of Insider
Trading, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 299 (1986). As a possible justification for this priority, Janvey cites
The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. WK., April 29, 1985, at 75, for the proposition that
72% of the stock prices of companies involved in takeovers, mergers and leveraged buyouts
increased, whereas if the stock prices had followed general trends, only 52% would have risen
in price. Janvey, supra, at 299 n. 1. That justification, however, misses the economic point that
in an efficient market, in which prices reflect all available information immediately, the reasonable investor will watch the market carefully in order to take advantage of such information.
Furthermore, the "SEC has rarely engaged in any empirical studies to determine whether
current or proposed regulations are necessary to cut abuses in the securities industry." Wolfson, supra note 9, at 120. It is hard to justify ITSA regulation without performing an empirical documentation of its validity. The rhetoric of fairness in the market, thus, is mere
propaganda, according to Haddock & Macey, and deliberately is aimed at misinforming the
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insider trading threatens the fairness and integrity of capital markets.3 22 Fair play, although never expressly defined, appears to
encompass a standard of equal access to market trading information.3 23 This policy of misinformation reduces opposition to agency
action, increases support from the favored group, the market professionals, and results in an overall increase in agency support.3 24
Along these redrawn lines, the market professionals have an
increased incentive to support SEC enforcement efforts because their
support enhances the public perception of industry honesty, which, in
most disadvantaged of the three groups interested in insider trading regulation, the public
investor. See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 9, at 323.
322. "Insider trading threatens these markets by undermining the public's expectations of
honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the same rules." H.R. REP.
No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983). The Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities
believed that even in the face of current economic theory and despite radical market changes
between 1934 and the present policy bases for insider trading regulation-fair play and the
integrity of the markets---are still sound. Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider
Trading Part I, supra note 149, at 225. The Committee was concerned that the increased
incidence of hostile tender offers, the decreased financial risk through use of options, and the
absence of clear guidelines on prohibited conduct combined to create incentives for insiders to
impede the flow of information originating within the corporation to the market in order to
speculate and profit. Id. at 227-29. Note that the Committee's position assumes that there is
no efficient market instantly reflecting information that forms the basis for trading, even before
it is announced. The Committee further opined that even when only market information
originating outside the corporation is involved, and even if the economic value of the
information is reflected in market prices before the announcement, this is fundamentally unfair
to initial trades. It did not, however, analyze why this should be so. The Committee appears
to base its rationale on what it calls a societal abhorrence of cheaters and sneaks. Id. at 227-29.
Again, no empirical evidence is presented.
323. The House Report asserted that the use of an informational advantage is unfair
because all participants should play by the same rules. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1983). Although, in Dirks, the Supreme Court expressly found that both the parity of
information standard and the parity of access to information standard were inapplicable, the
SEC's use of the misappropriation theory implies just such a standard. See Morgan, supra
note 93, at 88-89. Morgan notes that the Supreme Court has contributed to the uncertainty
concerning the underlying justification for insider trading rules by refusing to consider the
underlying premises of the rules. Id. at 90. He notes that "even if one accepts the notion that
insider trading should be regulated, it is very hard to tell which transactions will be subject to
that regulation" because the standards used are ill-defined and highly subjective. Id. at 90.
324. Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand,supra note 9, at 323. The authors remark
that:
[T]he barrage of public statements and news stories emanating from the SEC are
intended in part to discredit and deflect ordinary citizens' attention from the
ongoing academic debate about insider trading. Consequently, few ordinary
shareholders understand, or even monitor, the behavior of the SEC, meaning that
the informed support or opposition the SEC can expect from ordinary
shareholders is trivial.
Id. at 324. The market professionals' incentives to lobby for increased liability are greatest
because they have the greatest comparative advantage at trading and are most harmed by
insider trading. Id. at 336.
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turn, may increase client use of their services. 325 This theory also
explains the exchanges' willingness to provide the SEC with computerized information regarding trading patterns consistent with insider
trading activity. 26
Congress primarily assumed in promulgating ITSA that curbing
insider trading would randomly redistribute market profits among all
market participants.3 27 This is not true, however, because the market
professionals possess a significant informational advantage over the
investing public. Thus, the group that benefits from insider trading
regulation is the market professionals and not, as Congress and the
SEC asserted, the investing public. 3a2 This dissonance between the
SEC's regulatory stance and the social reality of pervasive practices
and efficient markets suggests that this is an area that needs the particularized situation-specific discourse of the community-the prime
function of the jury.
V.

RESTORING FAIRNESS:

A DIFFERENT VOICE

Although there is no guarantee that the jury will alter the social
discourse on insider trading regulations either in tone or direction, the
jury system provides an important bulwark against unwise legislation
and restores community values to the inherently arbitrary process of
decisionmaking.329 When the legislature enacts laws that appear
senseless and unfair to the community, the jury serves its most necessary function-ensuring that community values are implemented in
the legal process. Because of this critical function, the jury is a necessary and important part of the American system of checks and balances. 330 This protective function of the jury originally motivated the
325. Id. at 329.
326. Id. at 329.
327. See, e.g., id. at 338.
328. See id. Congress makes the assertion in the legislative history of ITSA that "[m]arket
makers and specialists, so necessary to the liquidity of the market, have suffered extreme
financial losses in such [insider trading] situations." H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1983). The SEC's general counsel makes a similar assertion that insider trading "threatens
the orderliness and stability of markets by exposing market professionals to substantial losses."
Goelzer, supra note 262, at 3.
329. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial
Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 58 (1977).
330. A strong concern for possible judicial and legislative tyranny informed the debates
over the inclusion of the seventh amendment in the Bill of Rights. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 983-1167 (1971); Wolfram, supra note 40, at
695. The framers included a constitutional right to jury trial in order to provide a bulwark
against government oppression. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979)
(Rhenquist, J., dissenting). The jury, therefore, is an essential part of the constitutional
structure of government. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-Op., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36
(1958).
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inclusion of the seventh amendment in the Constitution 331 and has
sparked heated debate ever since.332
Because trial to a jury is fundamentally different from trial to the
court, jury trials have the potential to significantly alter the legal discourse. Jury law differs from judge-made law in precisely those areas
in which the jury's sense of justice leads it to consider policies that
differ from official legal policies.333 The jury adds a dimension to the
legal process by interjecting discretion, equity, and flexibility.334 This
essential jury trait makes it an enduring feature of the American legal
landscape.335
When law and common sense conflict, as they arguably do in the
insider trading arena, the institution of the jury may alter the terms of
the legal dialogue.3 3 6 In at least some of these cases, the jury will
331. Reasons given by the antifederalists for expressly including the right to jury trial in the
Bill of Rights included the frustration of unwise legislation, the vindication of the interests of
private citizens in litigation with the government, and the protection of litigants against an
oppressive judiciary. See Wolfram, supra note 40, 667-725.
332. Compare H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24 (arguing that the jury is a vital and
irreplaceable part of the American judicial process) and Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry Into the
Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980) (discussing
the judicial encroachment on the jury's terrain in complex antitrust actions) with Devlin, Jury
Trialsin Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 43 (1979) (arguing that the jury is functionally disabled in complex litigation).
333. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 219 (1966).
334. Juries are just as tough as judges; however, their response is non-rule minded, focusing
on the equities. P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 31 (1984) (citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). "The fact that [the] deliberation process cannot be brought
under control as neatly as the trial, puts it beyond reach of the judge and attorneys, a
frustration that may account for continuing jury system criticism." Id at 56. The Kalven/
Zeisel study concludes that the jury "must rank as a daring effort in human arrangement to
work out a solution to the tensions between law and equity and anarchy." H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 499. "Not the least of the advantages is that the jury, relieved of the
burdens of creating precedent, can bend the law without breaking it." Id. at 498.
335. The common law tradition has been "cherished by Americans with peculiar tenacity."
R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 24, at 11. Part and parcel of that common law tradition is the role
of the jury in the judicial process. The very first legislation enacted in Massachusetts
concerned the right to trial by jury. Thus, "all that is extant of the legislation of Plymouth
colony for the first five years consists of the single regulation: 'That all criminal facts and also
all manner of trespasses and debts between man and man shall be tried by the verdict of twelve
honest men, to be impanelled by authority in form of a jury upon their oath.'" J. PROFFATT,
A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 121-22 (1877). Also, "[t]he strong and emphatic language in
reference to the right of trial by jury in some of our early state Constitutions shows further the
great estimation in which the privilege was held." Id. at 122.
336. The jury will do this by asserting its sense of community values in the legal
decisionmaking process. "In many ways the jury is the law's most interesting critic." J.
PROFFAT r, supra note 335, at 219. One commentator has suggested that:
The jury has the power to ignore the law, either consciously or unconsciously;
once it begins deliberating behind closed doors, it is free to do what it wants.
That is one of the essential criticisms of the jury system. Yet, there are those who
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decide differently than the judge.33 7 The research of Professors
Kalven and Zeisel, that found that there was an overall disagreement
rate between judges and juries for both criminal and civil trials of
approximately twenty percent, supports this assumption.338
One might expect that in a random sampling of cases, disagreements between the judge and the jury randomly would favor the
defense and the prosecution, regardless of the law at issue. Jury sentiment, however, is not random. Rather, there is a distinct pattern to
these disagreements.339 Specific prosecution and defense equities
motivate juries. 3 ' The question is whether the jury's inclusion in the
decision of insider trading liability will make a difference in the application of the law, and if so, whether that difference will be toward
greater or lesser leniency.
A.

The Jury Makes Law

Juries supposedly determine the facts, not the law. 34 ' Nonethe-

less, because ordinarily the jury brings in a general verdict, with no
requirement to state the basis of its beliefs on the questions of fact, the
jury actually determines the legal rights and obligations of the parties.342 The Kalven/Zeisel study substantiates this hypothesis by findargue that the jury has that power by more than implication, that it has the
absolute right to nullify when it sees fit.
P. DIPERNA, supra note 334, at 183 (1984).
337. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 56.
338. Id. at 56-65.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 378. The jury gives recognition to values that fall outside the official rules. Id. at
495. The jury becomes more willing to convict than the judge would have been when the
defendant's conduct so outraged the jury's sensibilities that even though the defendant's
conduct fell short of the legal definition of the crime, the jury's sensibilities overrode legal
distinctions. Id. at 395-97. An example of this phenomenon occurs with sex crimes
committed against children, in which the evidence clearly shows an assault, but in which there
may not have been the sexual penetration technically necessary to complete the crime. Id. at
396. It takes a heinous crime for the jury to have a stricter standard of liability than the judge,
however. Id.
341. Scholars who have studied the jury have widely recognized that the jury does not
merely decide fact. See, e.g., Green, supra note 20, at 157. The jury is more than the factfinding arm of the court; it applies the law in order to arrive at a verdict. Id.
342. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 184-85 (Smith ed. 1970). No fan of the

jury system, Frank thought that jury trials "created a government of often ignorant and
prejudiced men... [leading] to a capriciousness that is unnecessary and socially harmful." Id.
at 191-92. Frank was equally hostile to the concept of certain rules of law, however, and
opined that "the widespread notion that law either is or can be made approximately stationary
and certain is irrational and should be classed as an illusion or a myth." Id. at 13.
Furthermore, Frank acknowledged that the fact/law distinction was problematic at best, and
that one can "not nicely separate his belief as to the 'facts' from his conclusion as to the 'law.'"
Id. at 125.
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ing that 50% of the disagreements between the judge and the 43
jury
were based on differing sentiments about the law to be applied.1
The study showed that the overall imbalance in favor of the
defendant differed in civil and criminal trials. 3 " In criminal trials, the
study showed that the jury was harsher toward the defendant than
was the judge in only 3% of the cases, and more lenient-biased
toward the defendant-in 19% of the cases.345 In the civil cases, the
bulk of which were products liability cases, the judge/jury disagreement produced a net jury imbalance of 12% in favor of the plaintiff,
while the net judge imbalance was 10% in favor of the plaintiff.346 In
criminal fraud cases, however, the judge and the jury agreed only
69% of the time,347 as opposed to the 80% agreement rate for criminal and civil trials, and the jury was 25% more lenient than the judge
in these criminal fraud cases.348
Thus, there appears to be a significant difference between a
judge's and a jury's concept of what constitutes liability for fraud.349
Because the prosecution of insider trading cases is accomplished
30
under the rubric of fraud, however inappropriate that may be, 1
those cases offer a better analogy for purposes of assessing jury reaction than do general civil liability cases. Therefore, one might expect
a jury trying an insider trading action to be more lenient than the
court.
One of the foremost reasons for disagreement between the judge
and the jury is that the jury generally demands a higher degree and
343. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 111. Contrary to the conventional wisdom
that the jury is the trier of fact, not law, Kalven and Zeisel found that:
[I]n only one third of the cases is the jury's fact-finding the sole source of judgejury disagreement; in the remaining two thirds of the cases the sources of
disagreement are to be seen fully only by looking beyond the official role of the
jury.... [Rather] in exactly 45 percent of the cases, the jury in disagreeing with
the judge is neither simply deciding a question of fact nor simply yielding to a
sentiment or a value; it is doing both.
Id. at 116. Although this is the single reason for judge and jury disagreement only 22% of the
time, that finding is true of all reasons, indicating that there are often multiple factors involved
in the jury determination. Id. at 113. This was true of all factors, however, and by assigning
weights to the major categories, Professors Kalven and Zeisel were able to conclude that
"[a]part from evidence factors, the explanation for disagreements resides principally in jury
sentiments on the law or jury sentiments about the defendant." Id. at 115.
344. Id. at 58-59.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 63-64.
347. This figure should be contrasted with the 78% agreement rate for criminal trials. See
supra note 344 and accompanying text.
348. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 73.
349. Id.
350. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
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quantity of evidence to meet the burden of proof than does the
judge.3 5 ' Although the Kalven/Zeisel study focused on the reasonable doubt standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence
standard, the underlying premise for the basis of the disagreement is
the same in both cases: "[T]he jury, as an expression of the community's conscience, interprets this norm more generously and more
intensely than does the judge. ' 35 2 Although civil liability for insider
trading actions brought under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act must
satisfy only a preponderance of the evidence standard,3 5 3 a jury may
require a higher evidentiary standard. This is especially true for
ITSA because the statute provides no definition of culpable conduct,
such conduct is pervasive in society, and insider trading apparently
does not outrage community mores.35 4
If the judge and the jury disagreement rates, as Kalven and
Zeisel hypothesize, are the result of the non-rule orientation of the
jury and its willingness to look beyond the formalities of the law into

the intricacies of the particular case,355 then the crucial determinant
in deciding whether to request a jury trial in a securities fraud
action-indeed, whether to settle it by means of a consent decree 356 _
will be whether the case is persuasive to the jury's situation-sense. 35 7
The parties' sense of whether the jury understands and condemns the
defendant's actions informs this determination.
351. A judge and a jury require a different threshold for the amount of evidence needed to
meet the burden of proof, due to a difference between the judge's and the jury's "normative or
value judgement." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 189. "The jury may find the
evidence as credible as does the judge and may weigh it the same as the judge, and yet may
disagree and find the evidence wanting because in its view it falls below the required
threshold." Id. at 166.
352. Id.
353. Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Financeof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
95 (1983) (The standard of proof for actions brought under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is a
preponderance of the evidence.). See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 92-93 (1981) (The SEC
must demonstrate merely a preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and convincing
evidence.).
354. See supra notes 7 & 260 and accompanying text. Certainly, insider trading violations
do not outrage community mores the same way that, for example, sexual crimes against
children do. Moreover, sexual crimes against children were one of the few instances in which
the Kalven/Zeisel study found that the jury was stricter in assessing guilt than the judge would
have been. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
355. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 86-87.
356. The jury may be influential even though a case is pled or settled. Decisions about
whether to request a jury, indeed, whether to go to trial at all, are informed by expectations of
what the jury will do. Id. at 33-34.
357. Insider trading cases "often bristle with questions of material fact," making them
appropriate for jury determination. Jacobs, ProceduralMatters in Actions Brought UnderRule
lOb-5, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 361, 401 (1981).
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B. Jury Nullification: Extending the Social Dialogue
When society tolerates the widespread violation of a rule, a jury's
sense of equity is mobilized in sympathy for the defendant. 358 This
results in "jury nullification"-the refusal by a jury to follow the strictures of the law. Jury nullification is frequent when a jury perceives
legal distinctions to be artificial-creating a false boundary between
permissible and violative conduct.3 5 9 Jury nullification appears to be
a contradiction in terms only because the jury is supposed to determine facts, not law. 36 When the jury actually determines both facts
and law in the case before it, 361 however, jury nullification operates as
the power of the community asserting itself for the purpose of promoting justice.362
Jury response to gaming and gambling laws is a current example
of jury nullification of laws forbidding conduct pervasive in the society.363 In cases involving gambling and gaming, even where the evidence is ample to establish that a violation of the law has occurred,
the jury will acquit the defendant because it "thinks the law is too
severe." 36 ' It is important, however, not to carry the theme of jury
nullification too far in the context of insider trading. Modem jury
revolt is moderate; 36 there does not appear to be an issue that
inflames jury sentiment against unwise legislation in the way that the
prohibition or the colonial sedition laws did.3 66 Rather, modem jury
358. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 287. "[S]ince almost everybody is doing it,
it seems a -violation of the principle of evenhanded justice to single out this particular
defendant for prosecution." Id. Admittedly, it may be an overstatement with regard to insider
trading to claim that "almost everybody is doing it" since it requires at least access to
information and trading and, hence, financial status above the threshold of poverty.
Nonetheless, as these cases increasingly come into court and the population is increasingly
exposed to such cases through news reporting, it is likely that the jury will perceive this offense
as widespread. Certainly that is the perception of the SEC. See Remarks of Ruder, supra note
7 and accompanying text.
359. Id. at 291.
360. The jury evolved historically as the fact-finding arm of the court at common law.
Green, supra note 20, at 157.
361. See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
362. "The power to nullify or at least the choice to nullify is the jury's essential power." P.
DIPERNA, supra note 334, at 196.
363. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 289-91.
364. Id. at 290.
365. "The historic role of the jury as a bulwark against grave official tyranny is at best only
dimly evident in its contemporary role as a moderate corrective against undue prosecutions for
gambling, game, and liquor violations and, to some extent, drunken driving." Id. at 296.
366. Professors Kalven and Zeisel point out that there is no current crime in which the jury
is at war with the law, so as to cause widespread jury nullification, such as occurred during
Prohibition and during the colonial period for the crime of seditious libel. H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 76.
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revolt is a moderate, discrete, and illuminating voice for a poorly
defined and controversial area of the law.

Moreover, the jury operates as an important check, not only on
the law itself, but on the uneven application of the law. For example,
in the Kalven/Zeisel study, when the jury perceived that prosecution
of gambling laws was arbitrary and political, it often acquitted offenders, even though the judge found that the evidence was ample to convict. 367

Because uneven prosecution of the insider trading laws is
practically inescapable, if the SEC's perception of a widespread and
pervasive practice is correct, the jury may well perceive such prosecution as arbitrary and political. The jury therefore may be more lenient
under these circumstances than would the judge.3 68

In addition to inequitable prosecution, the appropriateness of the
punishment may be of special concern in insider trading cases.369 In
such cases, which often involve multiple parties, the jury may perceive
any discrepancy in the treatment of the parties to be unfair. More
lenient treatment of the dominant "partner in crime" particularly
aggravates jury sensibilities because it adversely affects the jury's perception of evenhanded justice.3 70 In the scandal involving Dennis
Levine and Ivan Boesky, 37 1 for example, it rapidly became apparent
367. Id. at 289-90.

368. The problem of uneven prosecution may be exacerbated by the recent passage by
Congress of new insider trading legislation. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (to be codified at
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). This legislation provides the SEC with authority to award
informants a bounty of up to 10% of any civil penalties later imposed. Id. at § 3(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 21A(2)(e). This legislation will enhance the already great incentives to turn in one's trading
partners at the first hint of an SEC investigation. See infra note 371 and accompanying text.
369. The concern for appropriateness of the punishment is what Kalven and Zeisel term a
concern for "preferential treatment." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 313.
370. Id.
371. SEC v. Kidder Peabody, Civil Action No. 3869 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. filed June 4, 1987),
Litigation Release No. 11452 (Investment bank alleged to have traded in securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information, and alleged to have parked securities for entities
controlled by Ivan Boesky, consented to a permanent injunction, without admission or denial
of allegations, disgorgement of $13,676,101, and an ITSA civil penalty $11,618,674.); SEC v.
Boesky, No. 86 Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 14, 1986), Litigation Release No. 11288
(Arbitrageur charged with violating Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the 1934 Act and Rules lOb-5
and 14e-3 by trading in material nonpublic information obtained in exchange for $2.4 million,
consented to a permanent injunction, disgorgement of $50 million, and an ITSA civil penalty
$50 million.); SEC v. Sokolow, No. 86 Civ. 5193 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1986) (Vice president
of investment banking firm charged with leaking material nonpublic information regarding its
clients to Dennis Levine in return for $120,000, consented to a permanent injunction,
disgorgement of $120,000, and an ITSA civil penalty of $90,000.); SEC v. Wilkis, No. 86 Civ.
5182 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1986), Litigation Release No. 11605 (Former investment banker
with Lazard Freres & Co., and later vice president of mergers and acquisitions at E.F. Hutton
& Co., charged with trading on information either misappropriated from his employers or
received from Dennis Levine, consented to a permanent injunction, disgorgement of $3
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that those who were most involved-those who made the most money
from their trading activity and who, therefore, had the most to tell the
SEC regarding their accomplices-received relatively light sentences
compared to their less culpable cohorts. 372 These appear to be the
type of cases referred to in the Kalven/Zeisel study as those in which
the jury perceives "the differentiation in treatment, if any is warranted, [to be] moving in the wrong direction. ' 373 For example, in an
instance of complex corporate fraud involving the president and the
chief accountant of a corporation, Kalven and Zeisel reported that the
judge's directed acquittal of the president precipitated the jury's
acquittal of the accountant, based on the jury's unwillingness to convict the agent when the principal went free.3 74
Logically, if disproportionate punishment stimulates jury leniency, then permitting the jury to determine the appropriate civil penalty will result in less disagreement between the judge and the jury. 375
Unfortunately, in Tull, the Supreme Court foreclosed that avenue in
insider trading cases by separating the liability and penalty assessments between the jury and judge in civil penalties actions. 37'6 The
jury will only be able to determine liability, and therefore, its discretion will be limited.
It is possible, however, that the jury may be ambivalent about the
acceptability of insider trading, even if it perceives the practice as pervasive and its prosecution uneven and unwise. Although the analogy
is inexact, this is certainly the case with drunken driving, which
apparently elicits a complex response from the jury, depending on
how many jurors are drinkers themselves and whether any harm
million, and an ITSA civil penalty of $300,000.); SEC v. Levine, No. 86 Civ. 3726 (RO)
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 12, 1986), Litigation Release No. 11605 (A Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc. director who was charged with insider trading consented to a permanent injunction and a
disgorgement of $11.6 million of the more than $12.6 million profit he had made from his
transactions, and his accountant was ordered to disgorge illegal profits and pay an ITSA civil
penalty.).
372. One cannot help but speculate what verdict a jury would have come to had it decided
the fate of Ilan Reich, a young partner in a New York law firm who apparently made no
profits on the tips he was alleged to have given the investment banker, Dennis Levine. SEC v.
Ilan K. Reich, No. 86 Civ. 7775 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 9, 1986), Litigation Release No. 11246
(entering consent decree for permanent injunction and ITSA fine of $485,000). See 8
American Lawyer 1(7) (December 1986). Reich was sentenced to one year and one day,
although his co-defendants were sentenced to comparatively lighter sentences. United States v.
Reich, 661 F. Supp. 371, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Reich later moved to reduce his sentence, but
his motion was denied. Id.
373. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 313.
374. Id at 316.
375. Although this assertion makes intuitive sense, the Kalven/Zeisel study was unable to
corroborate the hypothesis with empirical data. Id. at 311 & n.8.
376. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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other than property damage occurred.37 7 Moreover, common knowledge of the penalty involved, and a consensus that the penalty is too
severe, intensifies the complexity of the jury's reaction in drunken
driving cases. 378 Likewise, in insider trading cases, the jury may view
the penalty as overly severe, even if the jury does not condone the
defendant's conduct. This perception of the penalty's severity may
depend greatly on the financial ramifications to the individual defendant resulting from a finding of liability. In addition, the response of
the jury may also depend on how many jurors have experience trading
on the market, and whether they view insider trading as a victimless
crime.
In addition to the effect it has on individual defendants, jury nullification is a frequent source of legislative change.3 79 In the Kalven/
Zeisel study, the authors noted that when the Indiana legislature
observed the high rate of drunken driving acquittals in Indiana, it
amended its law to make the penalty less severe.380 A historical
example of a legislative response to jury nullification derives from the
refusal of English juries to convict for crimes that carried the death
penalty in the early Nineteenth Century.38 ' Parliament subsequently
abolished the death penalty for the large majority of crimes in England as a direct result of this kind of jury activism.38 2
Even if the majority of insider trading enforcement actions are
settled,38 3 the possibility of jury nullification adds an important check
on the unbridled power of a government agency that has increased
significantly its enforcement activity in recent years. 384 This ability to
check a government agency is even more important in the context of
the SEC, an agency that purports to regulate the economic activity of
the securities markets, but does not utilize empirical economic
research in assessing the costs and benefits of its regulatory agenda
and ignores current economic theory in its conceptual framework. 38 5
Despite the modern day politeness of the jury's war with the law,38 6
377. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 293-95.
378. Id. at 293.
379. Id. at 310-12.

380. Id. at 310 & n.6.
381. Id. at 310-11.
382. Id.
383. The possibility of having a jury trial affects even the vast majority of cases that settle.
See Green, supra note 20, at 158. The "mythical jury" enters the calculus because the
"strengths and weaknesses of the case are tested against the presumed reactions of the
mythical jury ... in the venue of the case." Id.
384. For a discussion of the dangers that the unremitting growth in the SEC's power poses,
see H. KRIPKE, supra note 2, at 37-58.
385. For a discussion of this institutional problem, see Wolfson, supra note 9, at 120-34.
386. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
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the jury is a force to be reckoned with.387 Neither the courts, the
SEC, nor the legislature can afford to ignore the jury's voice.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has attempted to show how several factors combine to make the current regime of insider trading regulation shortsighted and unwise. These factors include broad liability without
guidelines that delineate the legality of specific conduct, broad liability for conduct that is pervasive in American society and is not intuitively immoral, regulation based on false assumptions about history
and the marketplace, misconceptions about the economics of the market, and a lack of empirical support for the regulations.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Tull will help
to clarify this much-debated area of the law. Whether the Court
intended that its decision have such far-reaching consequences is
immaterial. The fact remains that the extension of the seventh
amendment right to jury trial to civil penalties actions means that the
community's voice will be added to the legal discourse regarding the
implementation of such penalties.
By increasing the role of the community in the judicial process,
the jury increases accountability not only of the judiciary, but of the
legislature. Furthermore, by extending the dialogue on social policy
to the courtroom, the jury positively alters the legal discourse, regardless of whether the particular case is tried or settled. This is an especially important function when the controlling legislation in the case
before the jury is unclear in concept and extremely broad in
application.
Because the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 permits the
SEC to seek civil penalties in the district courts of the United States,
enforcement actions that are not settled by means of a consent decree
should be tried to a jury. This has important ramifications, both for
the individual defendant and for the clarification of the legislation. It
will extend the social dialogue on insider trading policy by necessitating a coherent explanation of its rationale, as applied in the individual
case and for society as a whole.
Although extending the dialogue to the community may result in
greater leniency toward defendants, there is no guarantee that this, in
fact, will be the effect. Whether the effect of the jury's inclusion in the
debate is toward greater or lesser leniency, however, or even whether
387. Professor Green quoted Judge Ulman as remarking, "[I]t is a social safety-valve which
helps to keep the engine of the legal machine from blowing up." Green, supra note 20, at 165
(quoting J. ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND 34 (1933)).
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jury nullification occurs at all, including the jury's voice in the social
debate is a positive step.
ERICA CLEMENTS

